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SUMMARY:

Timely

The Govt appeals from a dee.is ion of the USDC

holding two provisions of the Black Lung Benefits Act uncon-

-----.;

stitutional.

The court held that the question was "not precluded'

two
by this Court's recent decision in National Independent Coal
Operator's Assoc. v. Brennan, No. 73-1902 (October 29, 1974),
summarily affirming 372 F.Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1974).

FACTS:

Plaintiffs below (a group of coal mine operators)

brought a blunderbuss attack on the 1972 federal legislation
known as the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §901 et seq.
They characterized the legislation as an unconstitutional attempt
to grant "reparations" to "financially distressed ex-miners
(and their families or survivors) who worked in coal mines
in years past and did not have the benefit of workmen's compensation coverage."

Plaintiffs criticized Congress' choice of

a "profoundly arbitrary and irrational scheme" of shifting the
burden of suppo:r:ting "inactive miners" to the industry and
pointed to Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S.
330 (1935), for support.
In addition, plaintiffs attacked the eligibility requirements of the statute which used a number of "presumptions" for
determining whether a miner was "totally disabled" from a "work
related" case of pneumoconiosis (black lung).

They argued

that such presumptions violated due process because they were
effectively rendered irrebutable by practicality and by other
provisions of the law and regulations promulgated thereunder.
See Owens v. Roberts, 377 F.Supp. 45, 49-50 (M.D. Fla. 1974)
(state welfare law fraud provision).
The USDC examined plaintiffs' generalized attack on the
statute and found no merit to the claim that the act imposed

three
liability for "remote claims" where the coal industry did not
insure against that particular risk because it was unknown.
The court concluded that Congress' policy decision to impose
liability for "remote claims" was not unreasonable and noted
that plaintiffs had not cited to any authority showing that
such liability violates constitutional safeguards.

The court

distinguished the Alton case on the grounds that the act met
the requirement of linking liability to disability related to
prior employm~nt.

---

The USDC, however, had more trouble with plaintiff's
attack on the statutory presumptions of the act under §92l(c). In
particular, it .found §92l(c)(3) and §92l(c)(4) violative of due

-

process.

Those provisions state as follows:
" ( 3) if ·a miner is suffering or suffered from a
chronic dust disease of the lung which (A) when diagnosed bv chest roentgenogram, yields one or more large
opaciti;s (greater than one centimeter in diar1:eter)
and would be classified in category A, B, or C m the
International Classification of Radiographs of Pneurnoconioses by the International Labor Organization, (B)
when diagnosed by biopsy or autopsy, yields massive
lesions in the lung, or ( C) when diagnosis is made by
either means would be a condition which could reasonably be exp~cted to yield results described in clause
(A) or (B), then there shall be an irrebuttable presumption that he is to~ally dis_abled due to pneumoconiosi s 017hat at the time of lus death he was totally
clisabled by pneurnoconiosis, as the case may be; and
" ( 4) if a miner was employed for fiftc~n y<'ars ~r
more in one or more und<'rgronnd coal mmes, and_ if
there is a chest roentgC'nogram submitted in connec_bo_n
with such miner's ... claim under this title, and 1~ 1s
interpreted as negative with respect _to the i_-eqmrements of paragraph (3) of this sulisccbon, an<l if oth_er
evidence d('monstrates the exist0nce of a totally <l1s-

four

(

abling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, tlwn
there sl1all he a relmttablc pr0sumption that sucl1 minPr
is totally disabl ed due to pncnmoconiosis, or that at
the time of this death he was totally <lisahled by
pneumoconiosis. . . . The Secretary may rebut surl1
presumption only by establishing that (A) such mi1wr
docs not, or did not, have pneurnoconiosis, or (B) his
respiratory or pulmon ary impairment did not arisPout of, or in connection with, employment in a coal
mine."

The court concluded as to §92l(c)(3) that it was "a departure
from the overall pattern of the Act which makes the existence
of both the disease and disability two (2) separate factors
which must be established before liability is imposed ."

The

USDC pointed to the language of §902(f) which defined " total
disability" as the point "when pneumoconiosis prevents him from
engaging in gainful employment" and held that §92l(c)(3) was
"unreasonable ancl arbitrary"

and violative of due process "in

precluding the opportunity to present evidence as to the effect
of a chronic dust disease upon an individual 'in determining
whether or not he is disabled."
The USDC then appears to have read §92l(c)(4) as limiting
the evidence that a coal operator may introduce to refute the
fact of disability.
is n~t disabling

The court emphasized that pneumoconiosis

~~

and held that requiring evidence that

the miner did not have the disease "is irrational where liability
is not predicated on the mere presence of the disease, but
rather on a complicated state of the disease."

In addition,

the court found it incompatible with the proviso of §932(c) -that exempts an operator from liability for black lung disability
"which did not arise, at least in part, out of employment in

five
such mi ne during the period when it was operated by such operator . "

The court held that there was "no rational basis" for

making the operator prove that the disability did not arise from
the miner's employment.

Rather, the Govt must prove the operator

liable for his mine's involvement in the disease.

CONTENTIONS:

The Govt (appellant in No. 74-1302) urges

that both provisions are valid legislative judgments.

As to

the "irrebu t able presumption" of disability in §92l(c)(3), the
Govt points out that pneumoconiosis,when it reaches the advanced

or "progressive" stage in which massive fibrosis and lesions
are present, is terminal and irreversible even though there
may be only mild pulmonary changes and little or no disability

in some patients. when detected.

The Govt argues that it was a

proper legislative judgment to categorize such patients as
among those who should be compensated even before the disease
has reached its final stage so that they are completely unable
to work.

I

Calling these patients "totally disabled" is, the Govt

argues, nothing more than a "shorthand method of expression"

which takes into account the inevitability of the disease.
As to the limitation on rebuttal evidence in §92l(c)(4),

the Govt argues that the USDC misread the statute.

The presump-

tion does not go into effect until the claimant shows: (1) 15 or
more years or mine employment, and (2) a totally disabling
respiratory or pulmonary impairment."

Only when these are

present does the statute presume the existence of pneumoconiosis;
nothing precludes a coal operator from introducing evidence

Six

tha t the p r econdition of "<lia bility" does not exist.

The Govt also criticizes

the USDC' s conclus ion t h at i t is improper to place a burden of proving no
employ m ent i n th e coa l mines, but the Govt' s argument is quite incomprehensible .
In re s p onse to the Govt' s arguments, plaintiffs suggest that the
"corre c tness of the District Court's conclusion . . . is manifest," since
they are "classic examples of a legislative attempt to enact into existence
facts tha t do not exist in actuality."

Plaintiffs (as appellants in No. 74-1316)

raise their general attack on the entire Black Lung Act, making a number of
policy arguments (it will cost too much; employers will be less likely to hire
older workers) as well as their constitutional claim that they are denied due
proces s by a "retroactive" and "constitutionally suspect departure from
_traditional compensation theory."
The Govt in response to the claims in No. 74-1316 urges that the
Court 's decision i n National Independent Coal Operators Ass 'n v. Brennan,
No. 73-1902 (Oct. 29, 1974, forecloses any further attack on the validity
of the statutory scheme.

DISCUSSION:

Regarding plaintiffs' broadside attack on the statutory

method of compensating disabled miners, the matter seems clearly to have
been resolved by National Independent Coal Operators as one which should
rest with Congress.

As to the "presumption" issues, the Govt's is most

persuasive that § 921 (c) (3)' s inclusion of terminal but not yet disabled miners
under the definition of "totally disabled" is merely a policy choice within
Congress' purview.

The Govt is somewhat less convincing regarding the

Seven

lim i t ati on s on rebuttal of § 921 (c)(4), partly because the USDC I s discussion
of this p rovi s ion is so confu s ing.

All that provision does is to presume that

a long - t erm c oal miner with a disabling lung disease does in fact have
pneumoc onio s i s -- a presumption which can be rebutted by the operator's
showing that i t isn't pheumoconiosis at all or that it was acquired somewhere
other tha n in the coal mines.

The provision doesn't forbid an attack on the

initial p a rt of the presumption (e.g., the fact that it is

11

disabling 11 ), nor does

it r equi re t he operator to carry a burden of proving the negative of something
that the G ovt should prove.

Nothing in the statute, including §932(c), gives

an operator t he right to compel the Govt to prove that the disease came from
the w orker 1 s m ining experience.
The pr oof from Congressional hearings was that miners acquired black
lung dis e ase w orking in the mines; it hardly seems startling that Congress
chose to permit various inferences from such circumstances to attain the
status of r ebuttable presumptions which shift to the operator the burden of
proving his defense under the statute.

It appears that the USDC has taken

what are at most slight, superficial inconsistencies between certain
provisions in the act and elevated them to the level of constitutional violation
without due regard for legislative policy choices.

Plenary consideration does

not seem necessary, and summary reversal may be in order.

This should

clear up any confusion as to the meaning of National Independent Coal
Operators.
There are motions to affirm.
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Dunlop v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Company
Turner Elkhorn Mining Company v. Dunlop

I would reverse No. 74-1302 and affirm No. 74-1316,
deciding both cases for the Government.

This is another

example of a circuitously drafted statute that contains a
few ambiguities and apparent contradictions.

I do not, on

balance, think that any of these ris~to the level of a due
process violation.
Congress apparently went to gr eat lengths to impose
the major share of the burden of Black Lung benefits upon the
federal government.

The imposition of liability on mine

operators is retroactive only insofar as operators are made
responsible for payments to miners who contracted the disease
during their employment, left work before the 1969 effective
date of the Act, and discovered their disability after
June 30, 1970.

As the SG points out, tort liability could be ~

established for this class under settled principles of
law.
The presumptions are a bit more troublesome.
Weinberger v. Salfi, cited by the SG, is of limited relevance,

-

2.

IJ

since this Act creates criteria for the imposition of burdens·.

-

on private parties, rather than criteria for the receipt of
f unds from the public treasury.

But "rationality" is the

standard to apply in any case and was the test adopted by
the district court.

-~
---

The test, described in my memo in

Lavine v. Milne, is whether the presumption is a rational
response to a rationally perceived problem.

I do not think

the presumptions fail that test.
Put most persuasively, the operators' argument
is that Congress failed to articulate the problem that would
support the inferences made.

That is, Congress could have

said that it intended to provide compensation for all miners
who have complicated pneumoconiosis (not just those totally
disabled by it) and all those who were totally disabled or
whose decedent was killed by a serious respiratory ailment
that has not been proved to be something other than pneumoconiosis.
e ,1e. n

If this were the express Congressio~al purpose, the presumptions

---

I\

found unconstitutional by the district court would be rational.
The argument is that Congress' express purpose here was only
to compensate cases of total disability or death by
pneumoconiosis and that the presumptions are therefore
overbroad.
There may be a legal argument to be made for
striking these presumptions down on the basis that they do not
suit the Act's expressed statutory purpose.

But this seems

3.

a silly gesture.

Congress could easily remedy the problem

simply by mouthing the right formula.

Moreover, there is

sufficient evidence that Congress rationally perceived that
overinclusiveness was necessary if the express purpose of
the Act was to be effectuated.

The SG and the UMW amicus

briefs do a good job of describing the problems to which
Congress was responding.

And there appears to be

support in the legislative history for the proposition that
Congress deliberately decided to be overinclusive and to
resolve doubts in favor of the miners in order to fully effecuate
the purpose of compensating those totally disabled by the
disease and the families of the deceased.
The apparent inconsistency in the Act may Be due
in part to the fact that it was formed in two stages.

It was

originally passed in 1969, and amendments were made in 1972.
The amendments were made because experience in the administration
of the Act indicated that somewhat loose, even overinclusive
presumptions were necessary if miners were to be compensated
to the extent desired by Congress.

uniJeC\l·if,~d t5p1to1'1~
It was necessary to presume that aJ\disease
is pneumoconiosis
I\

because of the inadequacy of past records (particularly crucial
when the question is survivor's benefits and the suffering
miner cannot be examined) and because medical techniques are
not sufficiently advanced to distinguish all cases of pneumoconiosis
from other respiratory disease.

The presumption in§ 921(c)(3),

4.

of total disability from the presence of the disease in a
complicated form~ is rational because the disease is in fact
wi II i,eeirm~

irreversible and always totally disabling.
C\Cfw>.\l~

The point at which

(\

it becomes so is hard to define.
/\

The SG convincingly demonstrates that the district
court's conc lusion that§ 92l(c)(4)'s limitations on rebuttal
evidence were unconstitutional was based on an erroneous
reading of the statute.

Since the section is premised on a

demonstration that the miner is totally disabled, liability
is not predicated on a mere finding of disease.

- +he. o pe;ro..l-o1"

limitation on rebut table evidence"

Nor is the

must p'l"o v e.

· , that the miner's

impairment did not arise out of employment in '~'mine unconstitutional.

Section 932(c) imposes a pr oviso on all

liability for benefit payments; t hat proviso, which overriaes
§ 92l(c)(4), allows an operator to escape liability for benefits
if the death or disability did not arise, at least in part,
out of employment in a mine operated by him.
Chris

No. 74-1302
No. 74-1316
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To:

Justice Powell

From:

Date: Dec. 3, 1975

Chris
Re: No. 74-1302
No. 74-1316

Dunlop v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. v. Dunlop

I expressed some concern about the presumption in§ 921(c)(3),
which reads as follows (with my organization for clarity's sake):
" ... if a miner is suffering or suffered from a chronic dust
disease of the lung which
(A) when diagnosed by chest roentgenogram, yields one
or more large opacities (greater than one centimeter
in diameter) and would be classified in category
A, B, or C in the International Classification of
Radiographs of Pneumoconioses by the International
Labor Organization,
(B) when diagnosed by biopsy or autopsy,~ yields massive
lesions in the lung,
or (e) when diagnosis is made by either means, would be a
condition which could reasonably be expected to yield
results described in clause (A) or (B),
then there shall be an irreb~ttable presumption that he is
totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or that at the time
of his death he was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis, as the
case may be; ... "
I was concerned about the irrebutable presumption that the disease
was pneumonconiosis; no evidence that it was not will be received.
But, as I told you, I think this is not unreasonable because Congress
could not determine an accurate and commonly accepted definition
of the disease.

In effect, this serves as a definition.
for another reason -The court below found this presumption unconstitutional/because

it irrebutably presumed disability from x evidence of the existence
of disease.

I addressed that point in my memo -- I think it reasonable

given the fact that the disease is always irreversible once it
becomes chronic.

If the conditions described are met, I xxx take

it, Congress has concluded that total disability will follow
inevitably; XKB there is medical testimony to support that assessment.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATF.8.
Nos. 74-1302

AND

74-1316

., \'\ W.. J. Usery, Jr., Secretary
of the United States Department of Labor,
et al:, Appellants, .
7:1-'-1302
v. .
T,u rner Elkhorn Mining
Company et aL
T.urner Elkhorn Mining
Company et al., .
Appellants,
7+-1316
v.
W : J. Usery, Jr., Secretary
of the United States Department of Labor,
et al.

On Appeals from the United .
States District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky.

[April -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Twenty-two coal mine operators (the "Operators")
brought this suit to test the constitutionality of certain
aspects of Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U. S. C.
§ 901 et seq. ( 1970 ed. and Supp. IV) . The Operators,
potentially liable under the amended Act to compensate
certain miners, former miners, and their survivors for
death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis arising out
of employment in coal mines, sought declaratory and in-

;

74-1302 & 'i4-1316-OPINION
2

USERY v. TURNER ELKHORN MINING CO.

junctive relief against the Secretary of Labor and the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, who are
responsible for the administration of the Act and the
promulgation of regulations under the Act.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, a three-judge
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky,
convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282 and 2284,
found the amended Act constitutional on its face, except
in regard to two provisions concerning the determination
of a miner's total disability due to pneumoconiosis. The
Court enjoined the Secretary of Labor from further application of those two provisions. 385 F. Supp. 424
U974). After granting a stay of the three-judge court's
order, 421 U. S. 944 (1975), we noted probabl-e jurisdiction of the cross-appeals. 421 U. S. 1010 (1975). We
conclude that the amended Act, as interpreted, is consti ..
tutionally sound against the Operators' challenges.

I
j

I
I

Coal workers' pneumoconiosis-black lung diseaseaffects a high percentage of American coal miners with
severe, and frequently crippling, chronic respiratory im ...
pairment.1 The disease is caused by long-term inhalation of coal dust. 2 Coal WO!fers' pneumoconiosis (here ..
1
The House and Senate Reports on the 1969 Act placed the·
number of afflicted active and retired miners at 100,000. S. Rep .
No. 411, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1969), and H. R. Rep . No. 563,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 17 (1969) . The Senate Report, supra, at 7,
specified that, on the basis of X-ray examination, the disease rate
was 10% for then-active coal miners, and 20% for inactive coaJ
miners. Other estimates have run significantly higher. See, e. g.,
Hearings on S. 355, before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Part
·2, at 641 (1969) .
2
Coal workers' pneumoconiosis is a distinct clinical entity, and is:
not the only type of pneumoconiosis. The remarks of the Surgeon
General, reproduced in H. E,. Re9. No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess .•
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after "pneumoconiosis") is generally diagnosed on the
basis of X-ray opacities indicating nodular lesions on the
lungs of a patient with a long history of coal dust exposure. As the Surgeon General has stated, however,
post-mortem examination data have indicated a greater
prevalence of the disease than X-ray diagnosis reveals.
According to the Surgeon General, pneumoconiosis is
customarily classified as "simple" or "complicated." 8
Simple pneumoconiosis, ordinarily identified by x-ray
opacities of a limited extent, is generally regarded by
physicians as seldom productive of significant ventilatory
impairment. Complicated pneumoconiosis, generally far
more serious, involves progressive massive fibrosis as a
complex reaction to dust and other factors ( which may
include tuberculosis or other infection), and usually 4
produces significant pulmonary impairment and marked
respiratory disability. This disability limits the victim's
physical capabilities, may induce death by cardiac failure,
and may contribute to other causes of death.5
Removing the miner from the source of coal dust has
so far proved the only effective means of preventing
the contraction of pneumoconiosis, and once contracted
the disease is irreversible in both its simple and compli~
cated stages. No therapy has been developed. Finally,
because the disease is progressive,° at least in its com~
at 15 (1969), indicate that the pathological condition of pneumoconiosis may also be caused by inhalation of other dusty materials,
such as cotton fibers or silica.
8
S. Rep. No. 411, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 7-8 (1969) ; H. R. Rep.
No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 15-16 (1969) .
4
There was evidence before Congress that the complicated stage
of the disease is sometimes exhibited with "mild pulmonary function
changes and little or no disability." Hearings on S. 355, supra, n. 1,
at 858.
5
8

Ibid.
lbirJ,
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plicated stage, its SYillPtoms mdecome aw areB,!i only \\
after4 ~
left the.Jloal mi~es. ~
-- 11
In order to curb th'; incideiice of pneumoconiosis, Congress provided in Title II of the Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969, § 201 et seq., 30 U. S. C. § 841
et seq., for limits on the amount of dust to be permitted
in the ambient air of coal mines. Additionally, in view
of the then-established prevalence of irreversible pneumoconiosis among miners, and the insufficiency of state
compensation programs, Congress passed Title IV of the
1969 Act, § 401 et seq., 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq:J_!.9.ZO ed.), to provide benefits to afflicted mineit_S and their
survivors. These benefit provisions were subsequently
broadened by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972. 30
U. S. C. § 901 et seq. (Supp. IV).
As amended, the Act divides the financial responsibility for payment of benefits into three parts. Under
P,.&£.LB of Title IV, §§ 411-414, 30 U. S. C. §§ 921-924
(1970 ed. and Supp. IV), claims filed between Decem- \
her 30, 1969, the date of enactment, and June 30, 1973,
are adjudicated by the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare and paid by the United States.7
Under Part C of Title IV, §§ 421-431, 30 U. S. C.
§§ 931-941 ~
O ed. and Supp. IV), claims filed aftel"
December 31, 1973, are to be processed under an applicable state workmen's compensation law approved by
the Secretary of Labor under the standards set forth in
§ 421, 30 U. S. C. § 931 (1970 ed. and Supp. IV) . In
the absence of such an approved state program, and to,
1 As of December 31, 1974, 556,200 claims had been filed under
Part B of the law. As of that date, with all but 400 cases decided,
509,900 individuals had established eligibility as black lung beneficiaries under the Act. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Fifth Annual Report to Congress on the Administration
of Part B of Title IV of the l<'ecleral Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969, at 3 (1975).
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date 110.. st,e_2ro&;am ,ha& been apprQ_ved, claims are
to be filed with and adjudicated by the Secretary of
Labor, and paid by ths, mine ogerators. § 422, 30
U. S. C. § 932 (1970 ed. and ~upp. rtT). Under § 422
an operator, who is entitled to a hearing in connection
with these claims, is liable for :e__a rt _Q benefits with
respect to death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis
arising out of employment in a mine for which the
operator is responsible. The operator's liability for Part
C benefits covers the period from January 1, 1974, to
December 30, 1981. Payments of benefits up,der Part C
are to the same categories of persons-a miner pr certain
survivors--and in the same amounts, as under Part B.
§§ 422 (c), (d); see§ 412 (a), 30 U.S. C. § 922 (a) (1970
ed. and Supp. IV) .8
Claims filed during the transition Reriod between Federal Government benefit provision under Part B, and
state plan or operator benefit provision under Part Cthat is, July 1 to December. 31, 1973-are adjudicated
under § 415 of Part B, 30 U. S. C. § 925 (Supp. IV), by
the Secretary of Labor. The United States is responsible

I

The individual claimant is entitled to benefits at a rate equal to
50% of the minimum monthly payment to which a totally disabled
federal employee in Grade GS-2 is entitled. § 412 (a) ( 1), 30 U. S. C.
§ 922 (a) (1) . At current rates, the individual claimant's entitlement is $196.80 per month, or $2,361.60 per year. 40 Fed. Reg,
56886-56887 (Dec. 5, 1975) ; see 20 CFR §410.510 (1975) . These
basic benefits are increased if the claimant has dependents; the
maxunum increase of 100% is available if the claimant has 3 or
more dependents. 30 U. S. C. § 922 (a) (4) (Supp. IV) . See also
30 U. S. C. §922 (a)(3), (5) (Supp. IV) . Thus, the maximum in
benefits to which a claimant could be entitled is $393.50 per month,
or $4,722 per year. Benefits under Part C are reduced to account
for certam alternative income. § 422 (g), 30 U. S. C. § 932 (g) .
In addition to these monthly benefits, the operators are responsible
for claimants' medical expenses. See § 422 (a), 30 U.S. C. § 932 (a)
(Supp. IV) , incorporating 33 U. S. G. § 907 (Supp. IV).
8

74-1302 & 74-1316-OPINION

6

USERY v. TURNER ELKHORN MINING CO.

for payment on these claims until December 31, 1973.
Responsible operators, having been notified of a claim
and entitled to participate in a hearing thereon, are
thereafter liable for benefits as if the claim had been
filed pursuant to Part C and § 422 had been applicable
to the operator.
The Act provides that a miner shall be considered
"totally disabled," and consequently entitled to compensation, "when pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine
or mines in whfoh he previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time." § 402 (f),
30 U. S. C. § 902 (f) (Supp. IV). 0 The Act also prescribes seve~ l "presumptions" for use in determmmg
compensable disability. 10 Under §411(c)(3), a miner
shown by X-ray or other clinical evidence to be afflicted
with complicated pneumoconiosis is "irrebuttably pre.
Section 402 (f) provides in full:
"The term 'total disability' has the meaning given it by regulations
of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, except tha.t such
regulations shall provide that a miner shall be considered totally
disabled when pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful
employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to those
of any employment in a mine or mines in which he previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time.
Such regulations shall not provide more restrictive criteria than
those applicable under section 423 (d) of Title 42." · 30 U. S; C.
§ 902 (f) (Supp. IV) .
The Act defines "pneumoconiosis"· as "a chronic dust disease of
the lung arising out of employment in a coal mine." § 402 (b) , 30
U. S. C. § 902 (b) (Supp. IV) .
10 These presumptions are applicable directly to Part B adjudica. tions by the Secretary of HEW, and indirectly to transition period
and Part C adjudications by the Secretary of Labor by operation
of §§ 422 (h) and 411 (b), 30 U. S. C. §§ 932 (h); 921 (b) (Supp.
IV) . See also §§422 (f)(2); 430, 30 U.S. C. §§932 ·(f)(2) ; 94{)1
(Supp. IV).
9

'
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sumed" to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis;
if he has died, it is irrebuttably presumed that he was
totally disabled by pneumoconiosis at the time of his
death, and that his death was due to pneumoconiosis. 30
U. S. C. § 921 (c)(3) (Supp. IV). In any event, the j
presumption o era
conclusivel to establish entitle- \
men
ene ts.
The other presumptions are each explicitly rebuttable
by an operator seeking to avoid liability. There are three
such presumptions. First, if a miner with 10 or more
years' employment in the mines contracts pneumoconiosis,
it is rebuttably presumed that the disease arose out of such
employment. § 411 (c)(l), 30 U. S. C. § 921 (c) (1)
(Supp. IV). Second, if a miner with 10 or more years'
employment in the mines died from a respirab1e disease,
it is rebuttably presumed that his death was due to
pneumoconiosis. § 411 (c)(2), 30 U. S. C. § 921 (c)(2)
(Supp. IV). Finally, if a miner, or the survivor of a
miner, with 15 or more years' employment in underground coal mines is able, despite the absence of clinical
evidence of complicated pneumoconiosis, to demonstrate
a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment,
the Act rebuttably presumes that the total disability is
due to pneumoconiosis, that the miner was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis when he died, and that the
miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis. § 411 (c )( 4),
30 U. S. C. § 921 (c)(4) (Supp. IV).11 Section 411 (c)
( 4) specifically provides that "[t]he Secretary may
rebut [ this latter] presumption only by establishing that
(A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or that (B) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment
did not arise out of, or in connection with, employment
11

The use of this presumption in Part C adjudications is limited.
in some regards not significant in this case. See §§ 421 (f) (2) ; 430,
30 U. S. C. §§ 931 (f)(2); 940 (Supp. IV).
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in a coal mine." Moreover, under § 413 (b), 30 U. . C.
§ 923 (b) (Supp. IV), none of these three rebuttable
presumptions may be defeated solely on the basis of a
chest X-ray.12

II
In initiating this suit against the defendant Secretaries
(hereafter the "Federal Parties"), thf:t Operators contended that the amended Act is unconstitutional insofar
asj t requires t§,_payment of benefits with respect.,to
miners who left em loyment in the indust before the
Act; t at t e Act's definitions, pree ec 1v a o
sumptions, and limitations on rebuttal evidence unconstitutionally impair the operator's ability to defend
against benefit claims; and that certain regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor regarding the apportionment of liability for benefits among operators, and
the provision of medical benefits, are inconsistent with
the Act and constitutionally defective.
The three-judge District Court held that all issues as
to the validity of the challenged regulations were within
the jurisdiction of a single district judge, and the Court
entered an order so remanding them. 385 F. Supp., at
426. The District Cou~t upheld each challenged statuSection 413 (b) provides in pertinent part : " ... no claim for·
benefits under this part shall be denied solely on the basis of the
results of a chest roentgenogram." 30 U. S. C. § 923 (b) (Supp.
IV) (emphasis added). Section 413 (b) is found in Part B of Title
IV. Section 430, 30 U.S. C. § 940 (Supp. IV), provides, however,
that "[t]he amendments made by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972'
to part B . . . shall, to the extent appropriate, also a.pply [ with limita,.
tions not relevant here] to .. . pa.r t [CJ." The legislative history,
moreover, makes clear that the § 413 (b) limitation on use of X-ray
evidence, enacted as § 4 (f) of the 1972 Act, was intended to apply
to Part C claims as well as Part B claims, see H. R. Rep. No. 1048,.
92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 9 (1972) , and the Operators so concede ..
13riEif for Operators, at 2l...
12

1'
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tory provision as constitutional, with two exceptions.
First, the District Court held that§ 411 (c) (3)'s irrebut~
table presumption is unconstitutional as an unreasonable
and arbitrary legislative finding of total disability "in
terms other than those provided by the Act as standards
for total disability.'' 385 F. Supp., at 430. Second, reading the limitation on evidence in rebuttal to § 411 (c)
( 4) 's presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis to apply to an operator's defense in a § 415
transition period case, the District Court found that
limitation unconstitutional in two respects, It held
the limitation arbitrary and unreasonable in not permittmg a rebuttal showing that the case of pneumoconiosis afflicting the min.er was not disabling. 385 F .
upp., at 430. And taking the provision to mean that
an operator may defend against liability only on the
ground that the pneumoconiosis did not arise out of employment in any coal mine, rather than on the ground
that it did not arise out of employment in a coal mine
for which the operator was responsible, the District Court
found the provision an unreasonable and arbitrary
limitation on rebuttal evidence relevant and proper under
§ 422 (c), 30 U.S. C. § 932 (c) (1970 ed.). 385 F. Supp.,
at 430-431. The District Court accordingly entered an
order declaring unconstitutional, and enjoining the Sec--retary of Labor from seeking to apply, § 411 (c)(3)'s
irrebuttable presumption and § 411 ( c) ( 4) 's limitation on
rebuttable evidence~
The Operator's appeal, No. 74-1316, reasserts the constitutional challenges rejected by the District Court.
The appeal of the Federal Parties, No. 74-1302, seeks
reversal of the declaration and injunction respecting the
constitutionality of§§ 411 (c) (3) and (4). Neither side
here questions the District Court's decision not to address
the issues. rAl$ed with respect to the Secretary of Labor'$
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regulations. As we have already noted, we uphold the
~tatute against all the constitutional contentions properly
presented here. Because we read the limitation on rebuttal evidence in § 411 ( c)( 4) as inapplicable to the
operators, however, we vacate that portion of the District
Court's order which invalidates that limitation.

III
The Federal Parties direct our attention initially to
National Independent Coal Operators Assn. v. Brennan,
372 F . Supp. 16 (DC), summarily ajI'd, 419 U. S. 95-ij
( 1974), which raised a number of issues identical to those
presented here. Our affirmance in that case did not fore ..
close the District Coures determination of unconstitutionality regarding §§ 411 ( c) ( 3) and ( 4), those issues
not having been before us on the appeal. Several questions presented here-most notably those of retroactivity
and preclusion of sole reliance on X-ray testimony evi·dence--were raised and decided in National Independent
'Coal Operators Assn. v. Brennan, but having heard oral
argument and entertained full briefing on these issues
together with the other questions raised in the case, we
proceed to treat them here more fully. Cf. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 670-671 (1974) .

IV
The Operators contend that the amended Act violates
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by requiring
them to c,2.mpensa! e former em:gloyees who terminated
th; ir woE!_< m ""tTie 1iictustryb efore the Act was passed,
ana ifie sl1l"vivors oi suc"fi employees.18 The Operatots.
13
For simplicit y of discussion, we will generally refer to claims as
though presented by the miner himself, although they may in fact
be maintained upon death by a survivor. Neither the parties nor
'the District Court have distinguished miners' claims from survivors;,
'claims under tlrn const1tu.t1onal at.tacks raised in this casf},

.
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.

'· ,
'~.
74-1302 & 74-1316-OPINION
USERY v. TURNER ELKHORN MINING CO.

11

'acoept the liability imposed upon them to compensate
'employees working in coal mines now and in the future
who are disabled by pneumoconiosis; and they recognize
'Congress' power to create a program for compensation
of disabled inactive coal miners. But the Operators
complain that to impose liability upon them for former
employees' disabilities is impermissibl;y to £_harge them
with an unexpected liabilit for ast, CQmpleted acts that
w~ egallyJ2roper an~ _at least in ill!,rt, unknown to ·qe
dangerous atfue time.
--rt'is 6yrioww ell established that legislative. aets
adjusting the burdens and bene'fits of economic life come
to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality,
and that the burden is on one complaining of a ·due
· process violation to establish that the legislature has
acted in an arbitrary and irrational way. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee
'Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 487-488 (1955). And this
Court long a.go upheld against due process attack , the
'competence of Congress to allocate the interlocking economi7 rights and duties of employers a{id employees
upon '~ rkmen's com_pensa,tion _principles' analogous , to
· those enacted liere,- regardless of contravening arrangements between employer and employee. · New Yark
· Central R . Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (19-17); see also
Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R . Co: v. Sch_u.,.
· bert, 224 U. S. 603 (1912) .
To be sure, insofar as the Act requires compensation for disabilities bred during ell}f'loyment terminated
before the date \ of enactment, the Act has some retro~
although, as we have notiea,=the Act
imposesnol bility on the operators until 1974.14 And

-

'~

'•

'•

-

......
a The Federal Parties suggest that since a claim for benefits

under Part C must be filed within three years of the discovery of
, total disability due to pneumoconiosis (or the date of death), § 42~

'
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pn II y
th e liabilitY imposed by the Act for

it

•

-~

~~

:,t, ,iat

disabilities suffered by former employees was not antioi0 \ ~ e---~
15
pated at the time of actual employment.
But o u r j ~
//
cases are clear that legislation readjusting rights and
~
,.,1 t~
burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets other. kj.', - (/
wise settled expectations. See Flemming v. Rhodes,
-:#'V ~ ;,~
331 U. S. 100 (1947); Carpenter v. Wabash R. Co., 309 _ . -~
i t~
~U. S. 23 (1940); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.,
.... -~
·
294 U. S. 240 (1935); Home Building & Loan Assn. v.
L ~
)~
Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934); Louisville & Nashville
_ .VftR . Co. v. Mottley, 219' U. S. 467 (1911). This is true \ ~ ~ ~
even though the effect of the legislation is to impose a
new duty or liability based on past acts. See Lichter V.
~
. / United States, 334 U. S. 742 (1948); Welch v. Henry,
•
305 U. S. 134 (1938); Funkhouser v. J. B. Preston Co.,
~ 7•
290 u. s. 163 (1933).
'\
It does not follow, howeveI\ that what Congress can I._
legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively.
Tp.e retrospective aspects of legislatiQP. · as well as the
prospective aspects, must meet the test of due r ocess,
and the justifications for tiie latter may not su ce for
the former. Thus, in this case the justification for the
retrospective imposition of liability must take into ac-

.

,.

J.ri.

(f)(l), 30 U.S. C. §932 (f)(l) (Supp. IV), the operators will not
ordinarily be liable for any disabilities maturing before enactment of
their responsibility. See also § 422 (f) (2), 30 U.S. C. § 932 (f) (2)
(Supp. IV). This does not hold true, however, for nonunderground
operators, since Part C liability did not apply to them until 1972.
See Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, § 3, 86 Stat. 153, amending
§§401; 402 (b), (d); 411 (c)(l), (2); 422 (a), (h); 423 (a), 30
U. S. C. §§ 901; 902 (b), (d); 921(c) (1), (2); 932 (a), (h); 933
,(a) (Supp. IV) . In any event, we think the point unnecessary to
our conclusion.
15 The Operators have not contended, however, that the Act is
constitut1onally defective insofar as it requires them to provide
compensation for present employees whose disabilities may stem
from exposure that was terminated before enactment of the Act,

)
I
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count the possibilities that the Operators may not have
known of the danger of their employees' contracting
pneumoconiosis, and that even if they did know of the
danger their conduct may have been taken in reliance
upon the curren,t state
of The law, which imposed no
.... ew.s
liability on them for disabling pneumoconiosis.111 While
the Operators have clearly been aware of the danger of
pneumoconiosis for at least 20 years,1 7 and while they
have not specifically pressed the contention that they
would have taken steps to reduce or eliminate the incidence of pneumoconiosis had the law imposed liability
upon them, we would nevertheless hesitate to approve
the retrospective imposition of liability on an~ theory o.f
deterrenQe, cf. United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 542
eworthiness, cf. id.,· DeVeau v. Brai.sted,
(1975), £> b
363 U.S. 144, 160 960 .
We find, however~ that the ill2Position of liability for
the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified as
a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees~
16 Whether or not a person who could have anticipated the potential liability attaching to his chosen course of conduct would
have avoided the liability by altering his conduct has been significant in at least one line of cases in this Court. In Welch v.
Henry, 305 U.S . 134 (1938), the Court upheld against a due process
attack a state statute enacted in 1935 taxing 1933 dividend income
that the 1933 taxing statute had explicitly exempted. Adopting the
view that a stockholder would have continued to receive corporate
dividends even if he knew that the dividends would subsequently
be taxed, the Court distinguished prior cases invalidating the retroactive taxation of gifts on the ground that the donor might have
refrained from making the gift had he anticipated the tax. / d.,
at 147-148. But see Carpenter v. Wabash R . Co ., 309 U. S. 23
(1940) ; Louisville & Nashville R . Co . v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467
(1911) .
17
Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was recognized in Great Britain as
early as 1943. It was not generally recognized m the Uruted States
as an entity distinct from silicosis until the 1950's. S. Rep. No. 41'1.,
91st Cong., 1st Sess.,.at 8 (1969) .
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disabilities to those who have profite from the fruits of
thei.io labor-the '7>per:t'ors ana the coal consumerso The
Operators do not challenge Congress' power to impose
the burden of past mine working conditions on the industry" They do claim, however, that the Act spreads costs
in an arbitrary and irrational manner by basing liability
upon past employment relationships, rather than taxing
all coal mine operators presently in business. The Operators note that a coal mine operator whose work force
has declined may be faced with a total liability that is
disproportionate to the number of miners currently employed. And they argue that the liability scheme gives
an @ fa!r.2,_ompetitive advant~ e to new entrants into the
industry, who are not saddi ed with the burden of compensation for inactive miners' disabilities. In, essence the
Operators contend that competitive forces will prevent
them from effectively passing on to the consumer the
costs of compensation for inactive miners' disabilities,
and will unfairly leave the burden on the early operators
alone"
Of course, as we have already indicated, a substantial
portion of the burden for disabilities stemming from the
period prior to enactment is born by the Federal Govern-ment. But even taking the Operators' argument at face
value, it is for Congress to choose between imposing the
burden of inactive miners' disabilities on all operators,,
including new entrants and farsighted early operators who,
might have taken steps to minimize black lung dangers,
or to impose that liability solely on those early operators·
whose profits may have been increased at the expense oi
their employees' health " We are unwilling to assess the
wisdom of Congress' chosen scheme by examining the
degree to which the "cost-savings" enjoyed by op'erators
'
in the pre-enactment period produced "~~
or the degree to which the retrospective lia ility imposed:
~
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on the e y operators can now be passed on to the consumer. It is enough to say1t.at the Act approaches the
problem of_ cost-spreading rationally; whether a broader
cost-spreading scheme would have_been wiser or more
practical under the circumstances is not a question of
constitutional dimension. See, e. g., Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 730-732 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955).
The Onerators ultimately rest their due process ar uon . o., 295
ment on Railroa
etirement oar v.
U. S. 330 0935) , in~ ich th e 'court found the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1934 to be unconstitutional. -Among
the provisions specifically invalidated as arbitrary was a
provision for employer-financed pensions for former employees who, though not in the employ of the railroads
-at the time of enactment, had been so employed within
the year,. Assuming that the portion of Alton invalidat- (
ing this provision retains vitality,18 we find it distingui~ a.bk from this case. The point of the black lung benefit
provisions is not simply to increase or supplement a
former employee's salary to meet his generalized need
for funds. Rather, the pua2ose of the Act is to satisfy a \
specific need created by the d angerous conditions under
which the former employee labored-to allocate to Jl!,e.
mine o rator an actual measurable cos't of his business.
n sum, e Due rocess ause poses no ar to requiring an operator to provide compensation for a
former employee's death or disability due to pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in its mines, even
if the former employee terminated his employment in
the industry before the Act was passed.
Chief Justice Hughes, joined by· Justices Brandeis, Stone and
Cardozo, dissented from the Court's invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act altogether, but agreed with the Court that the provision for allowances to former employees was arbitrary. 295 U. S.,
at 3'14, 389.
18
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V
We turn next to a consideration of the Operators' challenge to the "presumptions" and evidentiary rules gov•
erning adjudications of compensable disability under the
Act.
A

The Act prescribes two alternate methods for showing "total disability," which is a prerequisite to compensation. First, a miner is "totally disabled" under the
definition contained in§ 402 (f), if pneumoconiosis, simple
or complicated,
"prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities comparable to
those of any employment in a mine or mines in
which he previously engaged with some regularity
and over a substantial period of time." 19
Second, if a miner can show by clinical evidence ( ordinarily X-ray evidence) that he is afflicted with compli·cated pneumoconiosis, the incurable and final stage of the
disease, then the miner is deemed to be totally disabled
under§ 411 (c) (3) .20 Thus, Congress has mandated that
·rn For the full text of § 402 (f) see n. 9, supra.
20 Section 411 (c) (3) provides :
"[I] f a miner is suffering or suffered from a chronic dust disease of
-the lung which (A) when diagnosed by chest roentgenogram, yieldS'
, one or more large opacities (greater than one centimeter in diameter)
and would be classified in category A, B, or C in the International
•Classification of Radiographs of the Pneumoconioses by the International Labor Organization, (B) when diagnosed by biopsy or
autopsy, yields massive lesions in the lung, or (C) when diagnosis is
made by other means, would be a condition which could reasonably
be expected to yield results described in clause (A) or (B) , then there
· shall be an irrebuttable presumption that he is totally disabled due
to pneumoconiosis or that his death was due to pneumoconiosis or
that .at the time of his •death he was totally disabled by pneu•
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the final stage of the disease is always compensable if
its existence can be shown by positive clinical evidence,
and that any stage of the disease is compensable when
physically disabling under the terms of § 402 (f). The
Operators maintain that both of these standards are
constitutionally untenable.
(1)

The Operators contend that the definition of total
disability set up in § 402 (f) is unconstitutionally arbitrary and irrational, because it provides for the compensation of former miners who might well be employable in other lines of work, and who therefore are not
truly disabled by their mining-generated afflictions. ·w e
think it patent that this attack on § 402 (f) must fail.
A miner disabled under § 402 ( f) standards has suffered
in at least two ways: his health is impaired, and he
has been rendered unable to perform the kind of work
to which he has adapted himself. Whether these interferences medt compensation is a public policy matter
left primarily to the determination of the legislature.
Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U. S, 484 (1974). We can,..
not say that they are so insignificant as not to be a
rational basis for compensation. Indeed, we long ago up~
held against similar attack a workmen's compensation
scheme providing benefits for injuries not depriving the
employee of his ability to work. See New York Central"
R , Co. v. Bianc, 250 U. S. 596 (1919); cf. Urie v. Thompon, 337 U. S. 163, 181-187 (1949).

( )
The District Court, relying on such cases as Stanley ·v•.
Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972), and Vlandis v. Kline, 412'
moconiosis, as the ca,se may he."

H),

ao

U. S. C. § 921 (c) (3) (SupQ..
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U.
441 (1973), invalidated § 411 ( c)(3) 's "irrebutJ
table presumption" of total disability due to pneumocomosis based on clinical evidence of complicated pneu ..
mocomos1s. The presumption, the Court explained,
«'forecloses all fact finding as to the effect of that
disease upon a particular coal miner . . . . To the
extent that such presumption purports to making
a finding of total disability in terms other than those
provided by [ § 402 (f) ] as standards for total disability, it is unreasonable and arbitrary. As written,
section [411 ( c)(3)] is violative of due process in
precluding the opportunity to present evidence as
to the effect of a chronic dust disease upon an individual in determining whether or not he is
disabled." 385 F. Supp., at 429-430.
We think the District Court erred in equating this case
with those in the mold of Stanley and Vlandis. Section 411 (c) (3) does not suffer from the flaw that has
been present in our cases invalidating statutes as creating conclusive presumptions of fact.
As an operational matter, the effect of § 411 (c) (3)'s•
"irrebuttable presumption" of total disability is simply
to establish entitlement in the case of a miner who is
clinically diagnosable as extremely ill with pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment. 21 Indeed, the
Although the premise of §411 (c)(3), that the miner have a
"-chrome dust disease of the lung," does not explicitly provide that
the disease must be one arising out of employment in a coal mine,
it is clear under§ 422 (a), and hence under§ 415 (a) (5) as well, that
an operator can be liable only for pneumoconiosis arismg out of
employment in a coal mine. Section 422 (a) provides that Part C'
11ab1lity "shall be applicable to each operator of a coal mme . . .
with respect to death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis aris~
mg out of employment m such mine ." 30 U. S C. § 032 (a •
(Supp fV ).
21
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disabilities to those who have profite from the fruits of
their labor-th:' oper~ ors and the coal consumers. The
-= :w
Operators do not challenge Congress' power to impose
the burden of past mine working conditions on the industry. They do claim, however, that the Act spreads costs
in an arbitrary and irrational manner by basing liability
upon past employment relationships, rather than taxing
all coal mine operators presently in business. The Operators note that a coal mine operator whose work force
has declined may be faoed with a total liability that is
disproportionate to the number of miners currently employed. And they argue that the liability scheme gives
an @ falt,sompetitive advant~ e to new entrants into the
industry, who are not saddi ed with the burden of compensation for inactive miners' disabilities. In essence the
Operators contend that competitive forces will prevent
them from effectively passing on to the consumer the
costs of compensation for inactive miners' disabilities,
and will unfairly leave the burden on the early operators
alone.
Of course, as we have already indicated, a substantiai
portion of the burden for disabilities stemming from the
period prior to enactment is born by the Federal Government. But even taking the Operators' argument at face
value, it is for Congress to choose between imposing the
burden of inactive miners' disabilities on all operators,,
including new entrants and farsighted early operators who,
might have taken steps to minimize black lung dangers,
or to impose that liability solely on those early operators·
whose profits may have been increased at the expense ot
their employees' health. We are unwilling to assess the
wisdom of Congress' chosen scheme by examinhig the
·degree to which the "cost-savings" enjoyed by op'erators
in the pre-enactment period produced "~t'c~ ~'
or the degree to which the retrospective lia ility imposed:

I
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U.
441 (1973), invalidated § 411 ( c)(3) 's "irrebutJ
table presumption" of total disability due to pneumo<;omosis based on clinical evidence of complicated pneu ..
mocomos1s. The presumption, the Court explained,
uf orecloses all fact finding as to the effect of that
disease upon a particular coal miner . . . . To the
extent that such presumption purports to making
a finding of total disability in terms other than those
provided by [ § 402 ( f) ] as standards for total dis•
ability, it is unreasonable and arbitrary. As written,
section [ 411 ( c )(3)] is violative of due process in
precluding the opportunity to present evidence as
to the effect of a chronic dust disease upon an individual m determining whether or not he is
disabled." 385 F. Supp., at 429-430.
We think the District Court erred in equa.ting this case
with those in the mold of Stanley and Vlandis. Section 411 (c) (3) does not suffer from the flaw that has
been present in our cases invalidating statutes as creating conclusive presumptions of fact.
As an operational matter, the effect of § 411 (c) (3)'8·
"irrebuttable presumption" of total disability is simply
to establish entitlement in the case of a miner who is
clinically diagnosable as extremely ill with pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment. 21 Indeed, the21 Although the premise of §411 (c)(3), that the miner have a
"chronic dust disease of the lung," does not explicitly provide that
the disease must be one arising out of employment in a coal mine,
it is clear under§ 422 (a), and hence under§ 415 (a) (5) as well, that
an operator can be liable only for pneumoconiosis arising out of
employment in a coal mine. Section 422 (a) provides that Part C'
liability "shall be applicable to each operator of a coal mme .. ,
with respect to death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis arismg out of rmployment in such mine." 30 U. S C. § 932 (a~
(Supp IV ).
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legislative history discloses that it was precisely this ad~
vanced and progressive stage of the disease that Congress
sought most certainly to compensate. 22 Were the Act
phrased simply and directly to provide that operators
were bound to provide benefits for all miners clinically
demonstrating their affliction with complicated pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in the mines, we
think it clear that there could be no due process objection
to it. For, as we have already observed, destruction of
earning capacity is not the sole legitimate basis for compulsory compensation of employees by their employers.
New York Central R. Co. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596 (1919).
We cannot say that it would be irrational for Congress to
conclude that impairment of health alone warrants compensation. Since Congress can clearly draft a statute to
accomplish precisely what it has accomplished through
§ 411 (c) (3)'s presumption of disability, the argument
is essentially that Congress has accomplished its result
in an impermissible manner-by defining eligibility in
terms of "total disability" and erecting an "irrebuttable
presumption" of total disability upon a factual showing
that does not necessarily satisfy the statutory definition
of total disability. But in a statute such as this, regulat22 The original House and Senate Bills that gave rise to the Conference Bill enacted as Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969 each provided for compensation only for
complicated pneumoconiosis. H. R. 13950, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
'§§ 112 (b)(l), (7)(B), as it passed the House, 115 Cong, Rec. 32061
(Oct. 29, 1969), contained the diagnostic criteria presently embodied
in § 411 ( c) (3) , and deemed complicated pneumocortiosos to be
"totally disabling" and compensable. S. 2911, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 501-504, as amended on the floor, 115 Cong. Rec. 27632
(Sept 30, 1969), and passed, 115 Cong. Rec. 28243 (Oct. 2,
1969) , established a program of interim benefits for total disability
due to complicated pneumoconiosis, and directed the Secretary , of
Health, Education, and Welfare to develop standards for deter-•inining total disability due to complicated pneumoconiosis.
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ing purely economic matters, we do not think that Con.,
gress' choice of statutory language can invalidate the
enactment when its operation and effect are clearly pere
missible. Cf. McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U. S.
802, 809 (1969); United States v. Carolene Products Co,,
304 u. s. 144, 154 (1938).
This focus on the operative effect of the legislation,
rather than its particular phrasing, is consistent with our
modem cases employing "irrebutable presumption" terminology. E. g., Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In
none of these cases did the statute in question explicitly
create an irrebuttable presumption. The Court's focus in
each case was on the operation of the statute, not its phrasing, and no functionally identical reupholstering of the
statute would have saved it.28 In each case the fatal flaw
was not simply that the statute in effect created an irrebuttable presumption, but that the criteria that gave
rise to the so-called irrebuttable presumption did not
pass muster under the appropriate standard of review.
Since the criteria giving rise to § 411 (c)(3)'s presum~
tion of total disability provide a permissible basis for
compensation under the standard of rationality applicable to this legislation, we cannot say that it is uncon..
stitut10nal merely on account of the form of words.
28 Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926), also relied upon
by the Operators, is no different in substance. The enactment in.
validated in that case, levying an estate tax upon gifts made within
six years of death, was statutorily framed as a conclusive presumption that such gifts were made in contemplat10n of death and there,.
fore taxable. But the decision did not rest solely upon the statutory
framing. Rather, the Court made clear that, however drawn, the·
tatute could not, consistent with prevailing views of the Fourteenth
Amendment, have applied the tax to gifts solely on the ground that
they were made within six years of death. See also Heiner v. Don.rian, 285 U. S 312, 329 (1932).
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(3)
In addition to creating an irrebuttable presumption
of total disability, § 411 ( c) ( 3) provides that clinical evidence of a miner's complicated pneumoconiosis gives rise
to an irrebuttable presumption that he was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis at the time of his death, and that
his death was due to pneumoconiosis. The effect of these
p11esumptions, in particular the presumption of death due
to pneumoconiosis, is to grant benefits to the survivors
of any miner who during his lifetime had complicated
pneumoconiosis arising out of employment in the mines,
regardless of whether the miner's death was caused by
pneumoconiosis. The Operators raise no separate challenge to these presumptions, and we would have no
occasion to comment separately on them were it not for
the Operators' general complaint against the application
of the Act to employees who terminated their employment before the Act was passed. To the extent that the
presumption of death due to pneumoconiosis is viewed
as requiring compensation for damages resulting from
death unrelated to the operator's conduct, its application
to employees who terminated their employment before
the Act was passed would present difficulties not encountered in our prior discussion of retroactivity. The
justification we found for the retrospective application of
the Act 1s that it serves to spread costs in a rational manner- by allocating to the operator an actual cost of his
business, the avoidance of which might be thought to
have enlarged the operator's profits. The dama.ge resulting from a miner's death that is due to causes other than
the operator's conduct can hardly be termed a "cost'' of
the operator's business,.
We think it clear, however, that the benefits authorized by § 411 (c) (3)'s presumption of death due to pneumoconiosis were intended not simply as compensation for
d amages due to the miner's death 1 but as deferred com--
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pensation for injury suffered during the miner's lifetime
as a result of his illness itself. Thus, the Senate Report
accompanying the 1972 amendments makes clear Congress' purpose to award benefits not only to widows
whose husbands "[gave] their lives," but also to widows
whose husbands "gave their health ... in the service of
the nation's critical coal needs." 24
In the case of a miner who died with, but not from,
pneumoconiosis before the Act was passed, the benefits
serve as deferred compensation for the suffering endured
by his dependents by virtue of his illness. And in the
case of a miner who died with, but not from, pneumoconiosis after the Act was passed, the benefits serve an
additional purpose: the miner's knowledge that his dependent survivors would receive benefits serves to compensate him for the suffering he endures. In short, § 411
(c)(3) 's presumption of death due to pneumoconiosis
authorizes compensation for injury attributable to the
operator's business, and viewed as such it poses no retroactivity problems distinct from those considered in our
prior discussion.
It might be suggested that the payment of benefits to
dependent survivors is irrational as a scheme of compensation for injury suffered as a result of a miner's disability. But we cannot say that the scheme is wholly
unreasonable in providing benefits for those who were
most likely to have shared the miner's suffering. Nor
can we say that the scheme is arbitrary simply because
it spreads the payment of benefits over a period of time.2 s~, S. Rep. No. 743, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (19,72)
Under the present scheme, the payment of monthly benefits is
not without limit. Section 422 (e) quite clearly provides that "[n]o
payment of benefits shall be required under t his section ... (2) for
any period prior to January 1, 1974; or (3) for any period after
twelve years after December 30, 1969." 30 U. S. C. § 932 (e) (Supp.
IV) . This time limitation , applicable in Part C cases by its terms,
25
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W,e might face a more difficult problem in applying
§ 411 (c)(3)'s presumption of death due to pneumo-

coniosis on a retrospective basis if the presumption authorized benefits to the survivors of a miner who did
not die from pneumoconiosis, and who during his life was
completely unaware of and unaffected by his illness; or,
in the case of a miner who died before the Act was
passed, if the presumption authorized benefits to the
survivors of a miner who did not die from pneumoconiosis, who nevertheless was aware of and affected by his
illness, but whose dependents were completely unaware
of and unaffected by his illness. But the Operators in
their facial attack on the Act have not suggested that a
miner whose condition was serious enough to activate
the § 411 (c)(3) presumptions might not have been affected in any way by his condition, or that the family
of such a miner might not have noticed it. Under the
circumstances, we decline to engage in speculation as to
whether such cases may arise.26

B
Turning our attention to the statutory regulations of
proof of § 402 (f) disability, we focus initially on the
is also applicable to transition period cases by virtue of§ 415 (a)(5),
'30 U S. C. § 925 (a) (5) (Supp. IV). Thus, the operator JS liable
for monthly payments only for a period of eight years. The total
amount payable to a single dependent survivor during this period,
under current rates, is approximately $18,900. The maximum
amount for which the operator would be liable, if the mmer ha4
four or more dependent survivors, is approximately $37,800. See,
n. 8, supra.
:211 Our analysis •of the retrospective application of the § 411 ( c) (3)
-presumption of death due to pneumoconiosis is, of course, fully
applicable to the retrospective application of any other provisions
that might be construed to authorize benefits in the case of miners·
who die with, but not from, totally disablmg pneumoconios1s. See·
§§ 422 (a), (c) ; 412 (a), (2), (3), (5) ; 411 (a), 30 U. S. C. §§ 932'
,(a,L (r) 922 (a.),(2),, (3) , (5) : ·92.1 (a,); (\1970 ed. and Supp TV)~
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Operators' challenge to the presumptions contained in
§§ 411 (c)(l) and (2). Section 411 (c)(l) provides that
a coal miner with 10 years' employment in the mines
who suffers from pneumoconiosis will be presumed to
have contracted the disease from his employment.21
· ection 411 (c)(2) provides that if a coal miner with
10 years' employment in the mines dies from a respirable disease, his death will be presumed to have been
due to pneumocomosis. 28 Each presumption is explicitly
rebuttable, and the effect of each is simply to shift the
burden of going forward with evidence from the claimant
to the operator, See Fed. Rule Evid. 301,
We have consistently tested presumptions arising in
civil statutes such as this, involving matters of economic
regulation, against the standard articulated in Mobile,
Jackson and Kansas City R . Co. v. Turnipseed:
«'That a legislative presumption of one fact from
evidence of another may not constitute a denial of
due process of law or a denial of the equal protection
of the law it is only essential that there shall be
ome rational connection between the fact proved
·and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be
o unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate," 219 U, S, 35, 43 (1910),
Sect,1on 411 (c)(l) , as amended, provides in full :
" [I] f a mmer who 1s suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was
employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out
of such employment." 30 U S. C. § 921 (c) (1) (Supp. IV).
28 Sect,1on 411 (c) (2), as amended, provides in full :
.., [I] f a deceased miner was employed for ten years or more in one
or more coal mines and died from a respirable disease there shall be ·
a rebuttable presumption that his death was due to pneumoconiosis/ "'
\lO U. , C. § 921 (c)('2) (S11p_p. IV) .
27
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See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co . v. Ford, 287 U. S. 502
(1933); Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284
U. S. 8, 19 (1931) . See also Leary v. United States, 395
U. S. 6, 29-53 (1969); Tot v. United States, 319 U. S.
463, 467-468 (1943) . Moreover, as we have recognized :
"The process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature, highly empirical, and in
matters not within specialized judicial competence
or completely commonplace, significant weight
should be accorded the capacity of Congress to
amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it." United States v. Gainey, 380
u. s. 63, 67 (1965) .
Judged by these standards, the presumptions contained
in §§ 411 (c)(l) and (2) are constitutionally valid. The
Operators focus their attack on the rationality of the
presumptions' bases in duration of employment. But it
is agreed hem that pneumoconiosis is caused by breathing coal dust, and that the likelihood of a miner's
developing the disease rests upon both the concentration
of dust to which he was exposed and the duration of his
exposure. Against this scientific background, it was not
beyond Congress' authority to refer to exposure factors
in establishing a presumption that throws the burden of
going forward on the operators. And in view of the
medical evidence before Congress indicating the noticeable incidence of pneumoconiosis in cases of miners with
10 years' employment in the mines,2° we cannot say that
it was "purely arbitrary" for Congress to select the 10year figure as a point of reference for these presumptions.
No greater mathematical precision is required. Cf.
29 See,

e g., Hearings on S. 355, before the Subcommittee OJl
Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st
Cong., 1st, Sess., Part 2, p. 699 (Testimony of Dr. Werner A.
Laqueur).
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Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co ., 220 U. . 61, 78
(1911) .
The Operators insist, however, that the 10-year presumptions are arbitrary, because they fail to account for
varying degrees of exposure, some of which would pose
lesser dangers than others. We reject this contention.
In providing for a shifting of the burden of going forward to the operators, Congress was no more constrained
to require a preliminary showing of the degree of dust
concentration to which a miner was exposed, an historical
fact difficult for the miner to prove, than it was to
require a preliminary showing with respect to all other
factors that might bear on the danger of infection. It
is worth repeating that mine employment for 10 years
does not serve by itself to activate any presumption of
pneumoconiosis; it simply serves along with proof of
pneumoconiosis under § 411 ( c) ( 1) to presumptively
establish a cause of pneumoconiosis, and along with
proof of death from a respirable disease under § 411
(c) (2) to presumptively establish that death was due to
pneumoconiosis. In its "rough accommodations," Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69
(1913), Congress was surely entitled to select duration
of employment, to the exclusion of the degree of dust
exposure and other relevant factors, as signalling the
point at which the operator must come forward with
evidence of the cause of pneumoconiosis or death, as the
case may be. We certainly cannot say that the presumptions, by excluding other relevant factors, operate
in a "purely arbitrary" manner. Mobile, Jackson and
Kansas City R . Co . v Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 43
{1910)
The Operators press the same due process attack upon
the durational basis of the rebuttable presumption in
·§ 411 ( c )( 4) , which provides, inter alia, that a miner em--
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ployed for 15 years m underground mines, who is able to
marshal evidence demonstrating a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, shall be rebuttably presumed to be totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. 30 Particularly in light of the Surgeon General's testimony at
the Senate Hearings on the 1969 Act to the effect that
the 15-year point marks the beginning of linear increase
in the prevalence of the disease with years spent underground, 81 we think it clear that the durational basis of
this presumption is equally unassailable.

C
The Operators also challenge § 413 (b) of the Act,
which provides that "no claim for benefits ... shall be
Section 411 ( c) (4) , as amended, provides in full :
"[I] f a miner was employed for fifteen years or more in one or
more underground coal mines, and if there is a chest roentgenogram
submitted in connection with such miner's, his widow's, his child's,
his parent's, his brother's, his sister's, or his dependent's claim under
this subchapter and 1t is interpreted as negative with respect to the
requirements of paragraph (3) of this subsection, and if other
evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respiratory
or pulmonary impairment, then there shall be a rebuttable presump-tion that such miner is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, that
his death was due to pneumoconiosis, or that at the time of his
death he was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. In the case of a
living miner, a wife's affidavit may not be used by itself to establish
the presumption. The Secretary shall not apply all or a portion
of the requirement of this paragraph that the miner work in an
underground mine where he determines that conditions of a miner's
employment in a coal mme other than an underground mine were
substantially similar to conditions in an underground mine. TheSecretary may rebut such presumption only by establishing that
(A) such miner does not, or did not, have pneumocoruosis, or that
(B) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of,.
or in connection with, employment in a coal mine." 30 U. S. C~
§ 921(c) (4) (Supp. IV) .
u See S Rev, No 143, 92d. Cong., 2d Sess., at 13 (1972 ).
30

f4-1302 & 74-i31'3--0PiNI•- ~8

USERY v. TUltNER EtKHOR'N MINING CO.

denied solely on the basis of a chest roentgenogram
[X-ray]." z 2 Congress, of course, has plenary authority
over the promulgation of evidentiary rules for the federal
courts. See, e. g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U. .
74, 78 (1958); Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 467
(1943); cf. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U. S. 61, 81 (1911).. The Operators contend, however,
that § 413 (b) denies them due process because X-ray
evidence is frequently the sole evidence they can marshall to rebut a claim of pneumoconiosis. 33 We conclude
that, given Congress' reasoned reservations regarding the
reliability of negative X-ray evidence, it was entitled to
preclude exclusive reliance on such evidence.
Congress was presented with significant evidence
demonstrating that X-ray testing that fails to disclose
pneumoconiosis cannot be depended upon as a trus~
worthy indicator of the absence of the disease. 34 In particular, the findings of the Surgeon General and others
indicated that although X-ray evidence was generally the
rp.ost important diagnostic tool in identifying the pres-ence or absence of pneumoconiosis, when considered alone
it was not a wholly reliable indicator of the absence of
the disease ; that autopsy frequently disclosed pneumoz~See n. 12, supra
33 The Operators frame ·their argument by saying that the effect
qf § 413 (b) is to render the rebuttable presumptions of § 411 (c)
effectively irrebuttable. But this dressing adds nothing. Once it
is determined that the limitation on X-ray evidence 1s perm1SSible·
generally, it is irrelevant that the burden of going forward with
some rebuttal evidence IS thrown upon the operator by a permissible presumpt10n rather than by the claimant's affirmative factuaf
.showmg ,
34 Our attention has not been directed to any authoritative ind1ca.,.
tions that X-ray evidence of the presence of pneumocomosi.~ is:
~trustworthy.
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coniosis where X-ray evidence had disclosed none; 85 and
that pneumoconiosis may be masked from X-ray detection by other disease. 86
Taking these indications of the unreliability of neg~
tive X-ray diagnosis at face value, Congress was faced
with the problem of determining which side should bear
the burden of the unreliability. On the one hand, preclusion of any reliance on negative X-ray evidence would
risk the success of some nonmeritorious claims; on the
other hand, reliance on uncorroborated negative X-ray
evidence would risk the denial of benefits in a significant
number of meritorious cases. Congress addressed the
problem by adopting a rule which, while preserving some
of the utility, avoided the worst dangers of X-ray evidence. Section 413 (b) does not make negative X-ray
evidence inadmissible, or ineligible to be considered as
ultimately persuasive evidence when taken together with
other factors-for example, a low level of coal dust con~
centration in the Operator's mine, a relatively short duration of exposure to coal dust, or the likelihood that the
miner is disabled by some other cause.37 The prohibition
35

Evidence was produced at the Senate hearings showing that in
one study
"approximately 25 percent of a random sample of some 200 coal miners
whose medical records based upon X-ray findings showed no coalworker's pneumoconiosis were found on post-mortem examination
to have the disease." S. Rep. No, 743, 9,2d Cong., 2d Sess,, at 12
(1972) .
.
86
Id., at 9--16 ; H. R Rep. No. 460, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 8-10
(1971 ).
37 Section 413 (b) directs additionally that
"In determining the validity of claims under this part, all relevant
evidence shall be considered, including, where relevant, medical tests
such as blood gas studies, X-ray examination, electrocardiogram,
pulmonary function studies, or physical performance tests, and any
medical history, evidence submitted ·by the claimant's physician, or ·
'his wife's affi~Nit.s, and in t he case of a deceased miner, oth~,-

'
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is only against sole reliance upon negative X-ray evidence
in rejecting a claim.
The Operators attack the limitation on the use of neg•
ative X-ray evidence by suggesting that Congress' conclusion as to the unreliability of negative X-ray evidence
is constitutionally unsupportable. Relying on other evidence submitted to Congress in 1972, 38 the Operators contend that the consensus of medical judgment on the
question is that good quality X-ray evidence does reliably
indicate the presence or absence of pneumoconiosis. In
essence, the Operators seek a judicial reconsideration of
the judgment of Congress on this issue. But the reliability of negative X-ray evidence was debated forcefully
on both sides before the Congress, and the Operators
here suggest nothing new to add to the debate; they are
simply dissatisfied with Congress' conclusion. As we
have recognized in the past, however, when it comes to
evidentiary rules in matters "not within specialized judicial competence or completely commonplace," it is
primarily for Congress "to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it." United States v.
Gainey, 380 U. S. 63, 67 (1965) . It is sufficient that
the evidence before Congress showed doubts about the
reliability of negative X-ray evidence. That Congress
ultimately determined "to resolve doubts in favor of the
disabled miner" 39 does not render the enactment arbiappropriate affidavits of persons with knowledge of the miner's
physical condition, and other supportive materials." 30 U. S. C
§ 923 (b) (Supp. IV)
38
ThIS evidence was brought to the Heanngs by the Somal Security Admmistration, whose rules the § 413 (b) limitation was
,designed to overrule, and was credited by the minority of the HouseComm ittee on Educat10n and Labor . H . R Rep . No. 460, 92d Cong.~
]st Sess., at 22, 29-30 (1971) .
39
S. Rep No . 74~, 92d Cong, 2d Sess., at 11 (1972).

.

'
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trary under the standard of rationality appropriate to
this legislation .

D
Finally, the Operators challenge the limitation on rebuttal evidence contained in§ 411 (c)(4) . That section,
as we have indicated, provides that a miner employed
for 15 years in underground mines who is able to demonstrate a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment shall be rebuttably presumed to be totally
disabled by pneumoconiosis, and his death shall be rebuttably presumed to be due to pneumoconiosis. The final
sentence of § 411 ( c) ( 4) provides that
"[t]he Secretary may rebut [the presumption provided herein] only by establishing that (A) such
miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or
that (B) his respiratory or pulmonary impairment
did not arise out of, or in connection with, employ~
ment in a coal mine."
The effect of this limitation on rebuttal evidence is,
inter alw, to grant benefits to any miner with 15 yea.rsf"
employment in the mines, if he is totally disabled by
some respiratory or pulmonary impairment arising in
connection with his employment, and has a case of pneumoconiosis. The Operators contend that this limitation
erects an impermissible irrebuttable presumption, because
it establishes liability even though it might be medically
demonstrable in an individual case that the miner's
pneumoconiosis was mild and did not cause the disability- that the disability was wholly a product of other
disease, such as tuberculosis or emphysema. Disability
due to these diseases, as the Operators note, is not otherwise compensable under the Act.
The District Court, concluding that the quoted limita~
ti.an on rebut.ia.1 evidence applied against an operator iIJ
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a § 415 transition period case, and recognizing that pneumoconiosis is not inherently disabling in the § 402 (f)
sense, judged this limitation unconstitutional on the
ground that it deprived an operator of a factual defense--that the miner is not "totally disabled" due to
pneumoconiosis under § 402 (f). Additionally, reading
the second part of the § 411 ( c )( 4) limitation on rebuttal
to preclude an operator's defense that the disease did not
arise out of employment in the particular mines for
which it was responsible, the District Court found this
aspect of § 411 (c)( 4) unconstitutional as well.
The Federal Parties urge on their cross-appeal that
these constitutional judgments are erroneous. We need
not inquire into the constitutional questions raised by
the District Court, however, because we think it clear
as a matter of statutory construction that the § 411 ( c)
( 4) limitation on rebuttal evidence is inapplicable to
operators. By the language of § 411 ( c )( 4), the limitation applies only to "the Secretary" and not to an operator seeking to avoid liability under § 415 or § 422. And
this plain language is fortified by the legislative history,
The Senate Report on § 411 ( c )( 4) specifically states
that the limitation on rebuttal applies to the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare, but nowhere suggests that it binds on operator.40
While apparently recognizing that the § 411 (c)(4)
limitation on rebuttal evidence could not apply against
an operator in a Part C determination, the District Court
believed that the limitation bound an operator in the
determination of a claim filed during the § 415 transition
4<l S. Rep. No. 743, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 12 (1972) . Similarly,
-the Conference Report refers to the hmita.tion only as running
against "the Secretary." S. Rep. No. 780, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at S,;
(1972) ; H. R. Rep. No. 1048, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 (1972) .

'
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period, "[s]ince under section [415] the operator is
bound by the Secretary's finding of liability under Part
B." 385 F. Supp., at 430. In so concluding, the District
Court was in error. First, it would appear, again from
the plain language of the statute, that the reference to
"the Secr,etary" in § 411 ( c )( 4) does not ref er to the Secretary of Labor. On the contrary, § 402 (c) , 30 U.S. C.
§ 902 (c) (1970 ed.), quite plainly defines "Secretary"
when used in Part B, including § 411 , as meaning the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, not the
Secretary of Labor. The Senate Report referred to above
confirms this conclusion. Even assuming, however, that
the § 411 ( c)( 4) limitation on rebuttal by "the Secre•
tary" may be taken to bind the Secretary of Labor insofar as he was required to pay benefits for which the
United States was liable during the transition period,
§ 415 (a)(l), we have found nothing in the statute or
in its legislative history to suggest that an operator is
similarly bound because the Secretary of Labor is also to
adjudicate the operator's liability. § 415 (a)(5) . Indeed, such a reading would render a mine operator bound
by the rebuttal limitation in § 415 transition period
cases, although not so bound in cases filed thereafter
under Part C. And that result would be contrary
to the language of § 415 (a)(5), which prescribes that an
Operator "shall be bound by the determination of the
Secretary of Labor [on a § 415 transition period claim}
as if the claim had been filed pursuant to Part C."
In short, we conclude that the Act does not itself
limit the evidence with which an operator may rebut the
§ 411 (c)(4) presumption. Accordingly, we vacate the
order of the District Court declaring the § 411 ( c )( 4)
limitation on rebuttal evidence unconstitutional and enjoining the Secretary of Labor from limiting evidence in
rebuttal to the § 411 (c) ( 4) presumption. Cf. Van Lare

'
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v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338, 344 (1975); United States v.
Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950).
We are aware that regulations promulgated in 1972 by
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under
its § 411 (b) authorization, 20 CFR §§ 410.414, 410.454
( 1975), applicable to Part C determinations under § 422
(h), and ,expressly adopted in 1973 by the Secretary of
Labor, 20 CFR § 718 (1975), authorize limitations on
rebuttal evidence similar to those contained in § 411 (c)
( 4), and appear to apply in determinations of an operator's liability. But the Operators' amended complaint
never challenged the statutory or constitutional validity
of these r:egulations. 41 Particularly in the absence of
any mention of the regulations in the opinion and judgment of the District Court, or in the briefs a.nd oral arguments of the parties, we find it inappropriate to consider
their statutory or constitutional validity at this stage.42

VI
In sum, the challenged provisions, as construed, are
constitutionally sound against the Operators' facial at41Jt follows from our discussion of the §411 (c)(4) limitation on
rebuttal that these regulations cannot stand as authoritative administrative interpretations of the statute itself. But the role of
regulations is not merely interpretative; they may instead be
designedly creative in a substantive sense, if so authorized. See,
e. g., Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356
(1973) , If the regulations promulgated here are to be upheld, it
must be in this latter sense.
42 We see no reason to remand the case to the three-judge District
Court for the purpose of determining whether the Operators should
be granted leave to amend their complaint to include a statutory
and constitutional challenge to the regulations. The three-judge
oourt remanded to a single judge all questions regarding the validity
of regulations challenged in the Operators' complaint, and that
portion of the case is pending before a single judge. Any motion
for leave to amend the complaint to include a challenge to anyad.ditiona1 regula.tions can be addressed to that single judge.
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tack. The judgment of the District Court as appealed
from in No. 74-1316 is affirmed. The judgment of the
District Court as appealed from in No. 74-1302 is reversed, except insofar as it declares unconstitutional, and
enjoins the operation of, the limitation on rebuttal evidence contained in § 411 ( c )( 4) of the Act. In this
latter respect, the judgment in No. 74-1302 is vacated,
and the case remanded with directions to dismiss.

It is so ordered.
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MR.

JUSTICE. POWELL.

Appellants in No. 74-1316, the Operators, challenge as
unconstitutional the retroactive obligations imposed on
them by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq.
(Act). The Court rejects their contention in Part IV
of its opinion. I dissent from Part IV, but concur in
other portions of the opinion not inconsistent with the
views herein expressed.
I
Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was not recognized in the
United States until the 1950's, and there was no federal
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legislation providing benefits to its victims until the
enactment of this statute in 1969. In Title IV of the
Act, Congress significantly redefined the respective rights
and obligations of miners and their employers in regard
to this disease by establishing a benefits scheme to compensate victims of pneumoconiosis. 1 Under Title IV
miners who filed claims before July 1, 1973, are to collect
benefits from the Federal Government, §§ 411- 414, 30
U. S. C. §§ 921-924. 2 Miners filing claims after June 30,
1973, are to collect benefits until 1981,, see ante, at 22-23,
from their individual employers. § 415, 421-431, 30
U. S. C. §§ 925, 931-941. 3 Under the statute, the class of
• claimants to which individual employers are liable in. eludes both (i) miners employed at the time of or after
. enactment and (ii) miners no longer employed in the
industry at the time of enactment ( "former miners").
The unprecedented feature of the Act is tha,t miners
may be eli ible for benefits from particular coal-mining
. co~rnspen if the disability upon which -the claim~~
( based dev~ ed before e~~c~:1t of the la_
w,lana.eventJ
if the miner was no longer employed in the industry at
the time of enactment. The Department of Labor
alread~ has made initial determinations of liability
Title II of the Act prescribes the maintenance of less hazardous
' mine condition~ in the future. § 201 et seq., 30 U. S. C. § 841 et
: seq.
2 As does t4e Court, I simplify by not distinguishing between
claims by employees and claims by their survivors. See ante, at 10
· n. 13.
3 Claims filed between~uly 1, 1973, and December 31, 1973, were
' to be paid by the Federal Government until January 1, 1974, when
' they became the responsibility of individual mining concerns. § 415,
30 U. S. C. § 925. Liability on the part of individual mining concerns arises only if the claimant does not have recourse to an appli_cable state workmen's compensation program approved by the Secretary of Labor, §§ 421-422, 30 U. S. C. §§ 931-932, but no such
state programs have been approved. See ante, at 4-5.
1

·,.
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against one of the Operators and in favor of claimants
whose employment terminated decades ago.4

-

II

/'

J~

3

The O~rators d? not challenge their liability to miners ~ ~
employed at the time of or after enactmen_t which em:··°Q @)
~
bodies f - iliar principles of workmen's compensation. 5
The Operators contend, however, that their statuto~
liability to former miners has been imposed in violation
of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against arbitrary,
·, irrational, or discriminatory legislation, see, e. g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971), as there is no
rational justification for imposing liability to former
miners upon individual mine owners ana thereby competitively disadvantaging them vis-a-vis mining concerns
not so burdened.
Congress might have chosen to compensate the former
miners in question by any of a number of means. It
might, for example, have made the Federal Government
liable for all claims by former miners, not simply those
filed before July 1, 1973. It also might have required
the entire coal industry to contribute to a general fund
from which benefits would be paid. But Congress chose
to require individual employers to pay benefits to their
former employees. The legislative purpose is both legiti-

-----

-

Favorable initial determinations have been made for claimants o_,u ,Jjr,JJU.,; Ul'I--\ ~
who left mine work in 1920, 1923, 1927, 1931, 1932, 1937, 1943, f'J..1)cµd. -\ o ~ >
1946, and 1948. Brief for Operators, 30 n. 1. These determinations o . ~ ' 9 - ~ ~ 1
rebut the Government's suggestion that in combination the initial J- ~ ~
period of federal liability and the statute of limitations specified in
, -§422 (f)(l), 30 U.S. C. §932 (f)(l), ordinarily will prevent employer liability for disabilities maturing before passage of the Act.
See ante, at 11-12, n. 14.
5 The analogy to workmen's compensation principles is especially
obvious in light of the express statutory role for state workmen's
compensation programs. See n. 2, supra.
4
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mate and laudable. The question is whether the means
chosen to achieve the purpose bear "a fair and substantial relation" to that purpose. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920).
Congress, of course, had broad discretion in choosing
among possible means. E. g., Richardson, supra; cf.
'Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U. S. 483 (1954). The
'Constitution does not require-certainly with respect to
·'legislation on economic matters-adoption of means most
·compatible with sound economics or even fairness. But
'the means adopted must be rational, and in this case
the evaluation of rationality must take into account the
·retroactivity of the challenged liability. As the Court
uf~.;y
1
puts it:
)( ✓
"The retrospective aspects of the legislation, as wey"' ✓
as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due
process, and the justifications for the latter may not
suffice for the foi::mer, Thus, in this case the justification for the retrospective imposition of liability
must take into account the possibilities that the
Operators may not have known of the danger of
their employees' contracting pneumoconiosis, and
that even if they did know of the danger their conduct may have been taken in reliance upon the
current state of the law .... " Ante, at 13.
The Court purports to recognize that the question of the
rationality of the individual Operators' liability to former
miners is a troublesome one, see ante, at 13-14, but it
nonetheless sustains the challenged provisions. In my
view, the Court errs in doing so.

~ - .'}

A

The imposition of liability upon some individual emw
players but not others might be rational if those burtlened could be viewed as being culpable, in some sense,

1.,
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for the harm done to the former miners. Congress, however, was not of the view that the Operators were individually culpable for conducting their businesses in a
then lawful way and at a time when the dangers of
pneumoconiosis were not fully realizcd. 0 And the Court
acknowledges today that the Operators' liability cannot
be rationalized "on any theory of ... blameworthiness."
Ante, at 13. The purported justification thus must lie
elsewhere.
B
The Court justifies Congress' choice of means as
follows:
"We find ... that the imposition of liability for
the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified
as a rational measure to spread the cost of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from
the fruits of their labor-the o¢ators and .t,he coal
consumers." Id., at 13-14:
The 'courltnus relies solely on one of the traditional
justifications given for workmen's compensation laws.7
The Operators concede that the ~ p r e a d costs" ~"
Even Senator Javits, who played a significant role in the development of individual-employer liability, see Brief for Operators, at
34, thought that the "blame" for past neglect must be shared by
"all of us," including "the industry, the medical profession, and the
Government-particularly the Public Health Service." House
Comm. on Education and Labor, Legislative History/ Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act, 338 (Comm. Print 1970) (floor
remarks).
7
Another traditional justification for workmen's compensation Jaws
is that they provide an incentive for employers to maintain safe
working conditions. The Report of the National Commission on
State Workmen's Compensation Laws, 38-39, 87 ( 1972). This justification is not relevant to the Operators' retrospective liability, as
the Court recognizes. Ante, at 13.
6

~ ?
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makes rational their prospective liability to active and
future miners.
"The philosophy underlying workmen's compensation laws is that economic losses suffered by workers
as a result of disabling disease and injury incurred
in connection with their labor should be borne by
the consume.rs of the products whose production was
the occasion for their losses. Workmen's compensation laws achieve this result by transferring the loss
from the worker to his employer, who is better
capable of passing the loss on to consumers through
the price of the product, along with his other costs
of production." Brief for Operators, 35-36.
.J).

civ-Ai
IAckw,

M

~

~
-

,Ji.

- fh.,_

~

In prospective operation ,~ the- industry-as a whole can I.L ~~~ .:1-...lu.,
spr.ead the costs of pneumoconiosis to-those who benefit
c.osh. o.t fll$JJ...ll1? .
from the miners' labor, and any competitive disadvane 1.0~ h
taging of a firm would reflect a poor record for safety.
--tho&e \..ISl..ll:A,~
But the Act's retroactive liability arises after it is too
fu V J - ~
fate to take preventive safety measures, and the OperaaA a.. ~ a . ,
tors emphasize that such liability en an intl.-i-v:idttalized .SI., r
· ~~
·basis arises after it is too latefto spread costs- especially TO-Y IM,wtU/l;:J.J
in light of the history and economics of the coal industry.
Individual firms burdened with compensation payments
Q.O\. ts ()Ml.,
therefore are discriminated against despite the lack of a
rational relationship to Con ress' pu:cpQse in enacting ..JI .s-ti\\ s ~ \o
~ our .0.
the Act.
_j~ U)., s Q..,\('tJ..,..
Cursory examination of the industry reveals the force
~~~ o../J
of the Operators' argument. A notable fact about coal
mining is that the industry currently employs approxi~&.,. t.)I,..,
mately 150,000 persons, whereas in 1939 it employed
~~
nearly 450,000. Brief for Operators 24. The reduced
scale of the coal industry and the liability to survivors,
as well as to former miners, means that retroactive obligations threaten to be disproportionate to the scale of

}, W
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current operations. 8 In itself this might not prevent the
cost-spreading function relied upon by the Court to
justify employers' individual liability. But liability to
former miners is, of course, not randomly disturbed across
the industry, Rather, it is dictated by historical patterns thaeare unrel. ated to the present contours of the
industry.
o examples are illustrative: (i) Some coalmimlTg c ncerns have been in the mining business for
decades, while competitors have commenced operation
more recently. The exposure of the former group to
claims of employees long separa.ted from active employment will be significantly greater than that of their competitors. (ii) Some companies engaged in coal mining
in years past on a much larger scale and with many
more employees than currently. This is not an unusual
situation in a "depleting asset" industry, where smaller
companies often lack the resources with which to continue the acquisition and development of new properties. Stronger competitors, on the other hand, may have
operated on a constant or an increasingly large scale. 9
In each case the competitively disadvantaged companies simply will be unable to spread costs in any
meaningful sense. As already noted, the theory long
recognized as underlying workmen's compensation laws
is that economic losses suffered by workers as a result
of disease or injury should be a current operating expense, shared by the employer and the consumers _of the
8 Indeed, the number of former miners and survivors whom an
individual employer is obliged to compensate could be larger than
the employer's present workforce.
9 In addition, the incidence of liability to former miners may be
skewed artificially by the regulation imposing liability upon the company which last employed the claimant without regard to previous
employment with other companies. 20 CFR § 725 .311 (1975). The
validity of this regulation remains to be considered. See ante, at
9-10.
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products then produced. In its retroactive operation,
however, the Act imposes liability after the opportunity
to spread costs through market forces has passed. Individual operators burdened with retrospective liabilities,
especially the smaller ones, will be unable to compete
with those not so burdened, as their current cost of doing
business will be inflated by benefit payments bearing
no relation to current operations. The Act's result thus
is not to spread costs to "the operators and the coal
.
consumers," ante, at 14, but simply to penalize the dis- ~ l - ~ ~ lJ...,
advantaged operators despite their conceded lack of \ \\µii _· v'r'{I.. a.A\.~"
culpability. 10 This 1scriminatiofi etween burdened -1.,u»-\~ ~"~
and unburdened firms has no re ation to Congress' at- ~ 1 ~
7
tempt to enact a cost-spreading mechanism, 11 and the Act -\W ~ ~ ~
accordingly violates the Fifth Amendment in this ~A-' ~ &.o,l..(.., respect.
~ __u- c..c:ru..O. l ~
The Court notes that "coal consumers" "profited from the fruit
-of [former employees'] labor," ante, at 14, and therefore should
share the burden of benefit payments. This rationale demonstrates
conclusively the irrationality of the Act's retroactive liability as a
cost-spreading mechanism. A coal mining concern cannot rctro:actively increase its prices to the former customers who benefited
from the pre-1969 labors of former miners. The only consumers,
therefore, who could bear these burdens are those who purchase
coal currently. But in a free market such customers cannot be
expacteilto]pay reparation add-on for coal produced by disadvantaged coal companies when the same product is readily obtainable
from others at a lower price. The result must be to make the burdened companies uncompetitive.
11 The penalizing of concededly blameless firms with larger numbers of diseased former employees is irrational only because of the
retroactive nature of the liability. In their prospective application
it is rational for Title IV and other workmen's compensation schemes
to disadvantage competitively employers who take less effective
precautions to protect their employees. See - - , - - n. 5, supra.
But only prospective liability creates an incentive for occupational
safety measures.
10
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C
The Court apparently fails to recognize the invidious
nature of this discrimination despite its acknowledgment
that the justifications that rationalize prospectivOegislation may not rationalize retrospective legislation. The
Court's error, as I view it, may stem in part from its
frequent rejection in the past of challenges to legislation that had some retroactive application. See ante,
at 12.
It therefore is appropriate to note how little
support previous cases offer for today's holding. The
Court cites three cases as standing for the proposition
that "a new duty or liability [might be] based on past
acts," ante, at 12. In Funkhouser v. J. B. Preston Co.,
290 U.S. 163 (1933), however, the question was whether
a verdict in a breach-of-contract case could include interest when the statute providing for the assessment of
interest was passed after the claim arose. Funkhouser
thus differed significantly from this case, as the statute
provided only an additional remedial component for the
breach of a duty already defined. Lichter v. United
States, 334 U. S. 742 (1948), and Welch v. Henry, 305
U. S. 134 (1938), were both essentially tax cases, a
category of cases that are virtually sui generis, as the
Court recognized in Welch. 12 While drawing no significant support from these cases, the Court finds it necessary to distinguish the case most directly in point-Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330
(1935). I am not persuaded by the Court's distinction
of Alton, which turns on an asserted difference between
industrial "human wastage," Alton, supra, at 384
12 Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146 (1938): "Taxation is neither
a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes
by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government
among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens."

e
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(Hughes, C. J., dissenting), stemming from age and that
stemming from disease. It seems to me that Congress
~ 6:\ u-kc. ~ ?
is equally entitled to allocate f_ffie costs of e1t er age or -f"'u,,'-'\-· - - J '
disease "to the [employer as] an actual, measurable cost
of his business," ante, at 15. As a unanimous Court
found the retroactive imposition of pension benefits was Lk.,0 lJ) ..9.,JVJ ~
impermissible in Alton, the retroactive imposition of the
~
benefits in question here also should be impermissible.
---J
J\n ,,

f..

III
For the foregoing reasons I would hold the Act uncon.s titutional insofar as it requires the Operators to pay
benefits to miners not employed on the date of its enactment.18 In my view, it simply is not rational to
structure a legislative remedy in a way that imposes on
'one class of coal mining concerns a burden that, under
'the circumstances, fairly belongs on the entire industry
br on the public at large.

9
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Section 510 of the Act, see note at 30'Y. S. C. § 802, provides v ~ -f.o
that the invalidity of any application of the Act shall not affect the
~
application of the Act to other "persons or circumstances."
•
In light of the judgment of the Court, I do not deem it necessary 1.. ~ ~ ~ L
.t_o consider whether the Act authorizes the Federal Government to \. Lt,
~ay benefits to former miners filing after June 30, 1973, despite --~ l . . ' \ . 1 . . . Q . ~
the constitutional bar I perceive against the retroactive imposition
,-•
of liability on their employers. See § 424, 30 U. S. C. § 934.
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MR. JusTICE ST:mWi\RT, concurring in part and dissent-

ing in part
Although I agree with much of the Court's opinion, I
cannot join that opinion for at least two reasons.

·•.

,

'

A
In upholding the constitutiona.I validity of the irrebuttable presumption contained in § 411 (c)(3) of the
Act. now before us, the Court's opinion does not so much
as mention the decision of this Court tha,t s,eems to me
wholly dispositive. I refer to Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U. S. 749, decided less than a year ago. The Court in
that case, relying -1.nter alia on Dandridge v. Williams,
397 l L S, 471 1 :.tnd Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78)
,,

,,
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· clearly established the constitutional standa,,rd for legislation of the kind before us here :
" [T]he question raised is not whether a statutory
provision precisely filters out those, and only those,
who are in the factual position which generated the
congressional concern reflected in the statute. Such
a rule would ban all prophylactic provisions ....
Nor is the question whether the provision filters
out a substantial part of the class which caused
congressional concern, or whether it filters out more
members of the class than nonmembers. The question is whether Congress, its concern having been
reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse
which it legitimately desired to avoid, could ra~
tionally have concluded both that a particular lim.itation or qualification would protect against its
occurrence, and that the expense and other difficulties of individual determinations justified the
inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule .. . ,
422 U. S., at 777.
The provision of § 411 (c) (3) at issue surely passes
muster under this standard, and I would uphold it oh
that basis rather than upon the grounds discussed by
the Court. Ante, at 17- 20.

'•

.~ .
'•

B
I cannot accept the Court's conclusion, ante, at 32-34,
that the limitation on rebuttal evidence in § 411 ( c) ( 4),
30 U.S. C. § 921 (c)(4) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), is inapplicable to "transition" determinations under § 415 insofar
as those determinat10ns bind operators. Section 415
· (a)(5), 30 U.S. C. § 925 (a)(5), provides tha.t an "operator . . shall be bound by the determinations of the
Secretary of Labor r on a transition] claim as if the·
claim harl been filed pucsuant to part C of this sub,..

..- ~

~-

.

I•'
:•

I
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chapter and section 932 of this title had been applicable
to such operator." As the Court correctly observes,
the critical question is thus whether the § 411 ( c) ( 4)
limitation would apply "if the claim had b~en filed pursuant to part C ... and section 932 . ... "
The Court reads the "plain language" of § 411 ( c) ( 4),
and in particular the reference to "the Secretary [ of
Health, Education and Welfare]," to mean that "the
limitation applies only to 'the Secretary' and not to an
operator sr,eking to avoid liability under § 415 [30
U. S. C. § 925] or § 422 [30 U. S. C. § 932] ." Ante, at,
32. This reading, the Court concludes, is "fortified by
the legislative history" and in particular by .the "Senate
Report on § 411 ( c )( 4) [which] specifically states that
the limitation on rebuttal applies to the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, but nowhere suggests
that it binds an operator." Ibid.
The Court's analysis omits any · consideration of the•
effect of § 430, 30 U. S. C. § 940, which provides as
follows :
"The amendments made by the ·Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 to part B of thi_s subchapter shall,.
to the extent appropriate, also apply to [Part Cl:
Provided, That for the purpose of determining the
applic~bility of the presumption established by seotion 921 (c) ( 4) of this title to claims filed under this
part, no period of employment after June 30, 1971,
shall be considered in determining whether a miner
was employed at least fifteen years in one or more
underground mines."
Since the limitation on rebuttal evidence in§ 411 (c)(4)
was created by the "amendments made by the Black
Lung Benefits Act of 1972" it would seem to follow that
the limitation applies ·to Pa:rt C determinations. ThiB

1'
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inference is reinforced by the Senate Report, which
stated :
"New section 430 requires that amendments to
part B be applied, wherever appropriate, ta part ,C.
"Questions were raised during the Committee deliberations over whether the amendments to part B
would automatically be applicable, where appropri..
aLe, to part C.
•

,I

I

I,

1:

"

Q

,.,

HAithough it would appear clear that the same
standards are to govern, the Committee concluded
that it would be best to so specify.
"It is contemplated by the Committee that the
applicable portions of fo1lowing sections of part B,
as amended, would apply to part C: section 411, section 412 ( except the last sentence of subsection (b)
thereof), section 413, and section 414." Senate Report, at 2L
See also Senate Report, at 33.
The only play in the tight linkage of Part C to the
amendments to Part B is that 1'-fforded by the proviso
in § 430 and by the phrase "to the e;xtent appropriate"
which appears in that section. The proviso does not re-•
move the rebuttal limitation, but it does alter § 411 (c)
(4)'s allocation of the burden of proof in another crucial respect : It limits the period of employment which
may be considered for purposes of determining the applicabil ty of the presumption. The presence of the proviso
is relevant in two respects. First, it underscor~s the basic
applicability to Part C determinations of the § 411 ( c) ( 4)
rebuttal presumpt10n. Second, it demonstrates that
Congress knew how to place a significant limitation on
the applicability of that presumption when it chose to ·

do so.

'

.,.

I
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The care and precision which Congress used in drafting
this qualifying language bears on the propriety of read~
ing the phrase "to the extent appropriate" as obliquely
qualifying the applicability of the rebuttal limitation to
Part C determinations. That limitation is part and par~
eel of an elaborate reallocation of the burden of proving
disability resulting frem pneumoconiosis. Under prior
Social Security procedure "if an x-ray [ did] not show
totally disabling pneumoconiosis, no further processing
of a claim [was] allowed. Th us, any further evidence of
disability [was] not allowed if the x-ray show[ed] neg~
ative." Senate Report, at 11. This heavy reliance on
X-ray evidence had unfortunate consequences for coal
miners because of the inability of X.-ray examinations
to detect pneumoconiosis in some instances. Congress
responded to this particular problem by
"prohibiting denial of a claim solely on the basis of
an X-ray, by providing a presumption of pneumo.
coniosis for miners with respiratory or pulmonary
disability where they have worked 15 years or more
in a coal mine, and by requiring the Social Security
Administration to use tests other than the X-ray to
establish the basis for a judgment that a miner is or
i not totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis."
I

,,

Ibid,
The 15-year rebuttable presumption embodied in § 411
( c) ( 4) was perhaps the most significant feature of Con...
gress' response. Based in part on testimony of the Surgeon General that "[f]or work periods greater than 15
years underground, there was a linear increase in the
prevalence of the disease with years spent u11derground,'''
id., at 13, the presumption embodied a congression1:1,l decision to "giv[e] the benefit of the doubt,'' id., at 11, to
a specific class of claimants totally disabled bf respiratory
or pulmonary impairments who could not pn:ive by X-ray

,•

I
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evidence that the impainnent resulted from pneumo..coniosis. The presumption was rebuttable only if the
respondent could show eith~r ,that "(A) such miner does,
not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis, or that (B) his,
respiratory or pulmonary impairment did not arise out of,
or in connection with, employment in a coal mine."
§ 411 (c) (4), 30 U.S. C. § 921 (c) (4) .
It is difficult to believe that Congress would have
used the phrase "to the extent appropriate" in § 430 w
withdraw the protection of the rebuttal limitation under
Part C while retaining the rebuttable presumption of
which it is an integral part. Such an interpretation is,
inconsistent with the care Congress displayed in drafting the § 430 proviso. Moreover, it leads necessarily t<Y
other improbable results. The Court's approach, for instance, necessarily implies that Congress extended the
benefit of the § 411 ( c) ( 4) presumption to "surface, -as
well as underground, miners [in specified circumstances]," Senate Report, at 2, with the intention that"
the protection would lapse as soon as Part C came into
play. The revelant sentence in§ 411 (c)(4) states that
''[t]he Secretary [of Health, Education and W'elfare]
shall not apply all of a portion of the requirement of
this paragraph that the miner work in an underground
mine where he determines that conditions of a miner's
employment in a coal mine other than an imdergrouncf
mine were substantially similar to conditions in an under•
ground mine." (Emphasis added.) If the operative
principle is that provisions in § 411 (c)(4) which bind
'"the Secretary [of Health, Education and Welfare]" are·
automatically "inappropriate" for Part C proceedingsi
then surface miners would be stripped of the benefits of
§ 411 ( c) ( 4) as soon as the legislative scheme enters its::
tl'ansitional stag~.
Moreover, the Court's. reading of the statute is::
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a,nomalous in terms of the overall structure of Part C,
The primary goal of Congress in framing Part C was ta
transfer adjudicatory responsibilities over coal miners'
pneumoconiosis claims to state workmen's compensation
tribunals, but only if the state compensation law was
found by the Secretary of Labor to provide "standards
for determining death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis . . . substantially equivalent to . . . those
standards established under part B of this subchapter .... " Section 421 (b)(2)(C), 30 U.S. C. § 931 (b)
(2) (C). One of the Part B standards is the rebuttal
limitation in§ 411 (c)(4). Thus, the Secretary of Labor would not be empowered to approve a state law
which did not contain a "substantially equivalent" evidentiary limitation,
'
The delegation of adjudicatory responsibility to the
Secretary of Labor under Part C was a backstop measure, intended to provide a forum· for presentation of
claims during any period after January 1, 1974, when a
state workmen's compensation law was not included on
the Secretary of Labor's list of state laws with provisions
"substantially equivalent" to those in Part B. § 421 (a),
30 U. S. C. § 931 (a). See Senate Report, at 19~21.
Since the very reason for withholding i:i,pproval of a
state law and providing an alternative federal forum is
lack of "substantial equivalence" between the state law
provisions and the "standards established under part B,"
including the rebuttal limitation in § 411 ( c) ( 4), it
would be anomalous if the substitute federal forum could
employ evidentiary rules which deviate substantially
from those in Part B.
The statutory language and legislative history simply
will not yield such an unlikely result. The phrase "toi
·the extent appropriate" in § 430, 30 U. S. C. § 940,.
·plainly refers to language in part B which has no rele--

,.
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vance to Part C, notably the language that specifies that
"the Secretary [of Health, Education and Welfare] " is
to have certain adjudicative responsibilities. These are
the references that are not "appropriate" under Part C,
because Part C transfers adjudicative responsibilities to
the States or, in the alternative, to the Secretary of
Labor. The obvious purpose of the phrase "to the extent appropriate" is to accommodate minor linguistic
variations resulting from this transfer of responsibility.
Thus, the interaction of the phrase "to the extent appropriate" and the reference to "the Secretary" in the rebuttal limitation of § 411 ( c) ( 4) does not render the entire limitation "inappropriate" to Part C proceedings;
it merely renders the reference to "the ~ecretary" inappropriate under Part C.
It is significant that the Court's interpretation of
§ 411 ( c) ( 4) 's rebuttal limitation is not urged or even
suggested by any party to this suit. The Government's >
position is that the District Court erred by reading § 411
(c)(4) to foreclose a showing that would refute total
disability.
The Government is clearly correct.
The
§ 411 (c)(4) presumption comes into play only after the
claimant establishes total disability. See § 411 ( c)( 4) ,
30 U. S. C. § 921 (c)(4) (" . .. and if other evidence
demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption . . . ."). In addition, the District
Court ruled that§ 411 (c)(4) places upon a specific coal
mine owner the burden of proving that the respiratory
or pulmonary disease did not arise out of coal mine
employment.
The Government urges that this construction is erroneous, because it overlooks the fact that
under 30 U. S. C. § 932 (c) a specific operator can also
defeat liability by showing that the disability did not
arise, even in part, out of employment in his mine dur-
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ing the period when he operated it. Again, the Government is clearly correct. If the operator makes the § 932,
( c) showing, then the § 411 ( c )( 4) presumption- and
the rebuttal limitation-is irrelevant. Accordingly, I
would reverse the District Court's ruling that the § 411
( c) ( 4) rebuttal limitation violates the Constitution.
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Appellants in No. 74---1316, the Operators, challenge as
unconstitutional the retroactive obligations imposed on
them by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq.
(Act). The Court rejects their contention in Part IV
of its op1111on. -r\liflialrt fur rn Pert IY, bat concur in
other portions of the opinion not inconsistent with the
views herein expressed.

I
Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was not recognized in the
United Sta.tes until the 1950's, and there was no federal

,,-I;

.,,
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legislation providing benefits to its victims until the
enactment of this statute in 1969. In Title IV of the
Act, Congress significantly redefined the respective rights
and obligations of miners and their employers in regard
to this disease by establishing a benefits scheme to compensate victims of pneumoconiosis. 1 Under Title IV
miners who filed claims before July 1, 1973, are to collect
benefits from the Federal Government, §§ 411-414, 30
U. S. C. §§ 921-924. 2 Miners filing claims after June 30,
1973, are to collect benefits until 1981,. see ante, at 22-23~ n.
from their individual employers. § 415, 421-431, 30
U.S. C. §§ 925, 931-941. 3 Under the statute, the class of
claimants to which individual employers are liable in·cludes both (i) miners employed at the time of or after
enactment and (ii) miners no longer employed in the
industry at the time of enactment ("former miners").
The un recedented feature of the Act is that miners
may be eligib e
benefits from~rticular coal-mining ~
concern/atii!@M ii Y,o il.iaobiJ~~, ·1 r a u •· l nm @IE1im1f! HO
liuul i;louolop10d luhu !!I ut 11 t sf tl I I , AB9 even
if the miner was no longer employed in the industry at
' the time of enactment. The Department of Labor
• already has made initial determinations of liability

zs;
.

', .

1

Title II of the Act prescribes the maintenance of less hazardous
· mine conditions in the future. § 201 et seq., 30 U. S. C. § 841 et

seq.
2
As does the Court, I simplify by not distinguishing between
claims by employees and claims by their survivors. See ante, at 10
D. 13.
3
Claims filed between July 1, 1973, and December 31, 1973, were
to be paid by the Federal Government until January 1, 1974, when
they became the responsibility of individual mining concerns. § 415,
· :30 U. S. C. § 925. Liability on the part of individual mining concerns arises only if the claimant does not haYe recourse to an applicable state workmen's compensation program approved by the Secretary of Labor, §§ 421-422, 30 U. S. C. §§ 931-932, but no such
state programs have been approved. See ante, at 4-5.

.,, .
..

'.,, .

'

<

.
•

3.

against one of the Operators and in favor of claimants
4
whose employment terminated decades ago.

•

•

II.
The Operators do not challenge their liability
to miners employed at the time of or after enactment, a
liability which accords with familiar principles of work.men's
.
5
compensation.

They contend, however, ~hat a statutory
I

'

-~
l",

•'~

liability to former miners has been imposed in violation of
the Fifth Amendment guarantee against arbitrary, irrational,

;

or discriminatory legislation, see,~-~·, Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971), as there is no rational
justification for imposing liability to former miners upon
individual mine owners.
The Court recognizes that its evaluation of the
rationality of the employers' challenged liability must
take

into account the retroactive nature of the liability:
'~he retrospective aspects of the
legislation, as well as the prospective
aspects, must meet the test of due
process, and the justifications for the
latter may not suffice for the former.
Thus, in this case the justification for
the retrospective imposition of liability

t

,,

4.

must take into account the possibilities
that the Operators may not have known of
the danger of their employees' contracting
pneumoconiosis, and that even if they did
know of the danger their conduct may have
been taken in reliance ur.on the current
state of the law • . • • ' Ante, at 13.
The Court then acknowledges that the Act would not be
'

justified "on any theory of deterrence • . . or blameworthiness."

Id., at 13.

..'

It nonetheless sustains the

provisions for retroactive liability, reasoning as follows:
~

''We find . . . that the imposition
of liability for the effects of disabilities
bred in the past is justified as a rational
measure to spread the cost of the employees'
disabilities to those who have profited from
the fruits of their labor - the operators and
the coal consumers." Id., at 13-14.

.~ ,.

:

.,

* * . ,., . ,._
''We are unwilling to assess the wisdom of
Congress' chosen scheme by examining the
degree to which the 'cost-savings' enjoyed by
operators in the pre-enactment period produced
'excess' profits, or the degree to which the
retrospective liability imposed on the early
operators can now be passed on to the consumer.
It is enough to say that the Act approaches the
problem of cost-spreading rationally." Id.,
at 14-15.
In my view whether the retroactive liability is
constitutional is a considerably closer question than the
• Court's treatment suggests.

The rationality of retrospective

/

"··

5.

liability as a cost-spreading device is highly questionable.
I turn first to the question of cost-spreading to the Operators.
If coal mining concerns actually enjoyed "excess" profits
in the preenactment period by virtue of their nonliability
for pneumoconiosis, and if such profits could be quanitified
in some discernible way, Congress rationally could redistribut e

...

the profits to former miners whose uncompensated illnesses
created them.

But, in this content, the term ''excess

profits" must mean profits over and above those that
Operators would have made in years and decades past if
they had set aside from current operations funds sufficient
to provide the compensation, although under no obligation
to do so.

It is unlikely that such profits existed.

Coal

prices are determined in the market by normal competitive
forces.

One therefore would expect that, had a compensation

increment been added to operating costs, the Operators
simply would have passed it on to consumers, thereby
leaving their profit return unaffected.
Nor can I accept without serious question the Court's

''

view that the costs now imposed by the Act may be passed on
to consumers.

Firms burdened with retroactive

payments must meet that expense from current production
and current sales in a market where prices must be
competitive with the prices of firms not so burdened.
'"

6.

One ordinarily would expect that if burdened finns are
to meet both competitive prices and their retroactive
obligations, their profits necessarily will be less than
those of their competitors.

Thus, the burdened finns

in all likelihood will have to bear the costs of the
retroactive liability rather than passing those costs on
to consumers.

, ..

And they must bear such costs quite without

regard to whether "excess profits" may have been made in
.
6
some ear 1 ier years.
•

I

In some industries conditions might be such that
cost-spreading to consumers would not be prevented by a
competitive disadvantaging of burdened firms.

It seems

most unlikely, however, that the coal industry is such an
industry.

A notable fact about coal mining is that the

industry currently employs only about 150,000 persons,
whereas in 1939 it employed nearly 450,000.
Operators 24.

Brief for

The reduced scale of employment in the coal

industry, combined with the liability to former miners and their
survivors, means that retroactive obligations almost
certainly will be disproportionate to the scale of current
7

operations.

Moreover, it is unlikely that liability to

,.

•

·.·

fonner miners will be distributed randomly across the
industry, as it is dictated by historical patterns that
.•

may be wholly unrelated to the present contours of the

I

7.

industry.

Two examples are illustrative:

(i)

Some

coal-mining concerns have been in the mining business for
decades, while some competitors have commenced operation
more recently.

The exposure of the former group to claims

of employees long separated from active employment is
likely to be significantly greater than that of their
competitors.

(ii)

Some companies engaged in coal mining

in years past on a much larger scale and with many more employees than currently.

This is not an unusual situation

in a "depleting asset" industry, where smaller companies
often lack the resources with which to continue the
acquisition and development of new properties.

Stronger

competitors, on the other hand, may have operated on a
constant or an increasingly large scale.

8

In each case

the competitively disadvantaged companies may be unable
to spread a substantial portion of their costs to consumers.
In view of these considerations it is unrealistic to think
that the Act will spread costs to "the operators and the
coal consumers," ante, at 14, and thus I question the Court's
conclusion that the Act is rational in imposing retroactive
liability.
i,.•

III.
Despite the foregoing, I must concur in the
• judgment on the record before us.

Congress had broad

8.

discretion in formulating a statute to deal with the
serious problem of pneumoconiosis affecting former miners.
E.~., Richardson, supra; cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,

348 U.S. 483 (1955).

Nor does the Constitution require

that legislation on economic matters be compatible with
sound economics or even with normal fairness.

As a result,

economic and remedial social enactments carry a strong
presumption of constitutionality,. e.g, United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1938), and the
Operators had the heavy burden of showing the Act to be
unconstitutional.
The constitutionality of the retrospective
liability in question here ultimately turns on the
sophisticated questions of economic fact suggested above.

.,
"'
'

1

In this case, decided on the Government's motion for
sunnnary judgment, the Operators have failed to make factual

. . . . . . .....,ltr..-Xt.•

showings that support their sweeping assertions of
irrationality.

Although I find these assertions strongly

suggestive that Congress has acted irrationally in pursuing
a legitimate end, I am not satisfied that they are

evf>/:~;~;;;_

I

~f.>-~7'; . -

sufficient - in the absence o f ~ factualAshow1ng - to
1\

,.

override the presumption of constitutionality.

Accordingly,

I agree that the Government was entitled to sunnnary judgment
on this record.
,. I

I

FOOTNOTES

4.

Favorable initial determinations have been

made for claimants who left mine work in 1920, 1923, 1927,
1931, 1932, 1937, 1943, 1946, and 1948.
Operators, 30 n. 1.

Brief for

These determinations rebut the

Government's suggestion that in combination the initial
period of federal liability and the statute of limitations
specified in§ 422(f)(l), 30 U.S.C. § 932(f)(l), will

.
,.,

.

prevent employer liability to miners . who left the industry ·
before
/passage of the Act. See ante, at 11-12, n. 14.
5.

Congress apparently recognized that the

employers burdened by retroactive liability were not
blameworthy.

Senator Javits, who played a significant role

in the development of individual-employer liability, see

.•.,

Brief for Operators, at 34, thought that the "blame"
for past neglect must be shared by "all of us", including
"the industry, the medical profession, and the Government particularly the Public Health Service o"

House Comm. on

Education and Labor, Legislative History/Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act, 338 (Comm. Print 1970)(floor remarks).
The retroactive nature of the liability makes
deterrence an insufficient justification.

In their

prospective application, it is rational for Title IV and
other workmen's compensation schemes to disadvantage
competitively employers who take less effective precautions

,.'

to protect their employees.

But only prospective

liability creates an incentive for occupational safety
measures.
6.

It is, of course, impossible to spread

the cost to "coal consumers" who "profited from the fruit
of [former employees'] labor." Ante, at 14.

A coal

mining concern cannot retroactively increase its prices
to the former customers who benefitted from the pre-1969
labors of former miners.

The only consumers, therefore,

who could bear these burdens are those who purchase coal
currently.

But in a free market such customers cannot

be expected to pay a reparation add-on for coal produced
by disadvantaged coal companies when the same product is
readily obtainable from others at a lower price.
7.

Indeed, the number of former miners and

survivors whom an individual employer is obliged to compensat e
could be larger than the employer's present workforce.
8.

In addition, the incidence of liability to former

miners may be skewed artifi~ially by the regulation imposing
liability upon the company which last employed the claimant
without regard to previous employment with other companies.

-~

f

,·

t

•' , .

~

J

/V,.- ~-·

'

20 CFR

§

725.311 (1975).

remains to be considered.

The validity of this regulation
S e e ~ ' at 9-10.

'

'
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'·
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,,,J,

,·.

,,•,

,'.

LFP/gg

Rider A. p. 9

6-25-76

In this case, decided on the Government's motion for
sumnary judgment, the operators have failed to make factual
showings that support their sweeping assertions of
irrationality.

Although I find these assertions strongly

suggestive that Congress has ahosen an irrational means
to attain a legitimate end, I am not satisfied that they
are sufficient

-

..

'

in the absence of proof - to override

the presumption of constitutionality.

Accordingly, I

agree that the Government was entitled to sunma.ry judgment
on this record.
'
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring.
Appellants in No. 74-1316, the Operators, challenge as
unconstitutional the retroactive obligations imposed on
them by the Federal Coal Mine I!ealth and Safety Act of
1969, 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq,
(Act). The Court rejects their contention in Part IV
of its opinion. I concur in the judgment as to Part IV,
and concur in other portions of the opinion not inconsistent with the views herein expressed.

-..

I
Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was not recognized in the
United States until the 1950's,, and there was no federal

,,;

'

. ;// \

_,.

,,_,·,
'

,,
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legislation providing benefits to its victims until the
enactment of this statute in 1969. In Title IV of the
Act, Congress significantly redefined the respective rights
and obligations of miners and their employers in regard
to this disease by establishing a benefits scheme to compensate victims of pneumoconiosis.1 Under Title IV
miners who filed claims before July 1, 1973, are to collect
benefits from the Federal Government, §§ 411-414, 30
U. S. C. §§ 921-924. 2 Miners filing claims after June 30,
1973, are to collect benefits until 1981, see ante, at gg 93,
n. ~, from their indiviµQal employers. § 415, 421-431, 30
U.S. C. §§ 925, 931-941.3 Under the statute, the class of
claimants to which individual employers are liable includes both (i) miners employed at the time of or a.fter
enactment and (ii) miners no longer employed in the
industry at the time of enactment ("former miners").
The unprecedented feature of the Act is that minersmay be eligible to receive benefits from a particular coalmining concern even if the miner was no longer employed in the industry at the time of enactment. The
Department of Labor already has made initial determinations of liability against one of the Operators anc:T

2.,- 0-,

Title II of the Act prescribes the maintenance of less hazardous
mine conditions in the future. § 201 et seq., 30 U. S. C. § 841 et ·
1

.seq.
2 As does the Court, I simplify by not distinguishing between
claims by employees and claims by their survivors. See ante, at 10,
n. 13.
8 Claims filed between July 1, 1973, and December 31, 1973, wer&to be paid by the Federal Government until ~fflffrrt,~1"4.,.,wliaa,.,{
they became the respollilibility of individual mining concerns. § 415,.
'30 U. S. C. § 925. Liability on the part of individual mining con_/
cerns arises only if the claimant does not have recourse to an applicable state workmen's compensation program approved by the Sec-•
retary of Labor, §§ 421-422, 30 U. S. C. §§ 931-932, but no sucl._
sJ;ate l?rogi:aUIS have been approved. See ante, at 4--5.

\

,•,
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in favor of claimants whose employment terminated
decades ago.4

II
The Operators do not challenge their liability to miners
employed at the time of or after enactment, a liability
which accords with familiar principles of workmen's
compe11sation. 5 They contend, however, that a statutory liability to former miners has been imposed in violation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against arbitrary, irrational, or discriminatory legislation, see, e. g.,
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971), as there
is no ra.tiona,l justifica.tion for imposing liability to
former miners upon individual mine owners ..
The Court recognizes that its evaluation of the ra/

avorable initial determinations have been made for claimants
left mine work in ~ 1923, 1927, 1931, 1932, 1937, 1943,
, and 1948. Brief for Operators, 30 n. 1. These determinations
rebut the Government's suggestion that in combination the initial
period of federal liability and the statute of limitations specified in
§422 (f)(l), 30 U.S. C. §932 (f)(l), will prevent employer liability to miners who left the industry before passage of the Act.
See ante, at 11-12, n. 14.
5 Congress apparently recognized that the employe.rs burdened
by retroactive liability were not blameworthy. Sena.tor Javits, who
, played a significant role in the development of individual-employer
liability, see Brief for Operators, at 34, thought that the "blame"
for past neglect must he shared by "all of u4," including "the industry, the medical profession, and the Govhnment-particularly
the Public Health Service." House Comm. on Education and Labor,
Legislative History/Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 338
(Comm. Print 1070) (floor remarks) .
The retroactive nature of the liability makes deterrence an insufficient justification. In their prospective application, it is rational for Title IV and other workmen's .compensation schemes to
disadvantage competitively employers who take less effective precautions to protect their employees. But only prospective liability<;i_:e~tes 11,_n {nc~~iiv~ for QCC~.()l;!,tional Sl}fet:y measures.

,.,

'

.
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tionality of the employers' challenged liability must take
'into account the retroactive nature of the liability :
"The retrospective aspects of .._legislation, as well
as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due
process, and the justifications for the latter may not
suffice for the former, Thus, in this case the justification for the retrospective imposition of liability
must take into account the possibilities that the ·
Operators may not have known of the danger of
their employees' contracting pneumoconiosis, and
that even if they did know of the danger their conduct may have been taken in reliance upon the
current state of the law ...." Ante, at ~
The Court then acknowledges that the Act would not be
justified "on any theory of deterrence . . . or blameworthiness." Id., at 13. It nonetheless sustains the
provision, for retroactive liability, re&soning as follows :
"We find . . . that the imposition of liability for
the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified
as a rational measure to spread the cos~ of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from
the fruits of their labor-the operators and the cpal
consumers." Id., at 13-14.
, "We are unwilling to assess the wisdom of Congress'
chosen scheme by examining the degree to which the
'cost-savings' enjoyed by operators in the pre-enactment period produced 'excess' profits, or the degree
to which the retrospective liability imposed on the
early operators can now be passed on to the consumer. It is enough to say that the Act approaches
the problem of cost-spreading rationall~' Id., at
14-15.

------

_/
s

it

.. "✓
.

In my view whether the retroactive liability is consti-

f

I,

I·

.
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,.

tutional is a considerably closer question than the Court's
treatment suggests. The rationality of retrospective liability as a cost-spreading device is highly questionable.
p;0a.ding to tb"
If coal mining concerns actually enjoyed "excess"
profits in the pre-enactment period by virtue of their
nonliability for pneumoconiosis, and if such profits could
t.
be quantified in some discernible way, Congress ra.tion~
,
7
ally could rediiltrib1:1te the prefttis t6 fo1me1 miner.s-wb:ose-~mpDS.€·
- - ~ r --mireomp~~~-ttffi~~if'tea~t0~'1~tU;ih~e,iuw.. But, in this con- l,a.b,I
1 --1¼ ~f;t
te1t, the term "excess profits" must mean profits over
~ rt\ 1riU'Y.l ~Cal) eJ
11
nd above those that Operators would have made in
/
"'
years and decades past if they hll,d set aside from current
✓
✓·
perations funds sufficient to provide ~ compensation,
~
although under no obligation to do so. It is unlikely
that such profits existed. ~ftrt-'m"N~-ftf't~~~ft9€1--l.Jlv -,ic,. ~ ,~~\-~ ,:S

! -; ,

f'~ [

i

·

V:

h,~~~~

fore would expect that, had a compensation increment ~ tl,U'I./Y'I ,a II\\ cV"\Q...
been a.dded to operating costs, the Operators simply
).
~~•
'-4..J ~L: ~. mp D
would have passed,.lit on to consumers, thereby eavmg ket
-,.,,
•
th
lqfivt~ ~J:ll:e~iJ;.:.JlriP4c~an~I~a~cilollc:&ep-ttH'w~i~~hetou;et~serious question the Court's
I~ f<Vvv.,.._
~
¥\ sM-t,t,
view that the costs now imposed by the Act may be·
1N.. 7~
-I(
r., lk .~
"'"' AJ..
)
{ I~
_,__..._
passed on to consumers. Firms b urdened with retro~ # ~ SA\.L,.
active payments must meet that ~xpense from current
?"e. 4
~ i~
production and current sales in a market where prices
we..ol¼ ~ h+w-e,
must be competitive with the prices of firms not so
J I
·
'
burdened. One ordina.rily would expect that if burdened'
firms are to meet both competitive prices and their retroactive obligations, their profits necessarily will be less
than those of their competitors. Thus, the burdened
firms in all likelihood will have to bear the costs of the
retroactive liability rather than passing those costs on_...-fto. consumers. !nd they must bear such costs quite-

~1•~h,
+.e.c;{~,

~--f4

_J,,,.
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¥
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without regard to whether "excess profits" may have
been made in some earlier years. 6
1 , n some industries conditions might be such t h a t ~
.
vett!ieEl lw a
Q....~t>Q:~tMii'l:¥€1-Q;~~~~¼'l'ii~P"Q-YI~~s. It seems
most unlikely, however, that the coal industry is such
an industry. A notable fact about coal mining is that
the industry currently employs only about 150,,000 persons, whereas in 1939 it employed nearly 450,000.. Brief
for Operators 24. The reduced scale of employment •in
the coal industry, combined with the liability to former
miners and their survivors, mean,s that retroactive obligations almost certainly will be disproportionate to the
scale of current operations..7 Moreover, it is unlikely
that ·liability to former miners will be distributed randomly across the industry, as it ·is dictated by historical
patterns that may · be wholly unrelated to the present
contours of the industry, Two examples arn~llµstrative:
(i) Some coal-mining concerns have been in the n:µning
business for decades, while some competitors have commenced operation more recently. · The exposure of the
former group to claims of employees long separf:\,ted from
active employment is likely to be significantly greater
th~n that of their competitors. (ii) Some companies

j
s

_,

t

•

ft ..

'

'It is, of course, impossibie to spread the cost to "coal consumers"
'
'•/
whJ'o I "profited
from the frui'J\
of [former employees'] labor." Ante,
at 14. A coal mining concern cannot retroactively increase its prices
to the former customers who beqefitted from the pre-1969 labors
of former miners. The only consumers, therefore, who could bear
these burdens are those who purchase coal currently. But in a
free market such customers cannot be expected to pay a reparation
add-on for coal produced by disadv11,ntagecl coal companies when the
same product is readily obtainable from others at a lower price.
7
Indeed, the number of ' former miners and survivors whom an:
individual employer is obliged to compensate ooµld be larger than
the employer's present worfforce.
·

.
1
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engaged in coal mining in years past on a much larger
scale and with many more employees than currently.
This is not an unusual situation in a "depleting asset''
industry, where smaller companies often lack the resources with which to continue the acquisition and de..._,_;.;.;c'""'
velopment of new properties. Stronger competitors, on
the other hand, may have operated on a constant or an
increasingly large scale. 8 In each case the competitively
disadvantaged companies may be unable to spread a
substantial portion of their costs to consumers. In view
of these considerations it is unrealistic to think that the
Act will spread costs to "the operators and the coal consumers," ante, at 14, and thus I question the Court's
conclusion that the Act is rational in imposing retroactive liability.

III
Despite the foregoing, I must concur in the judgment
on the record before us. Congress had broad discretion
in formulating a statute to deal with the serious problem
of pneumoconiosis affecting former miners. E. g., Richardson, supra; cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U. S. 483 (1955). Nor does the Constitution require
that legislation on economic matters be compatible with
sound economics or even with normal fairness. As a re,,
sult, economic and remedial social enactments carry a
strong presumption of constitutionality, e. g. , United'
States v. Carolene Products Co. , 304 U. S. 144, 148
(1938) , and the Operators had the heavy burden of
showing the Act to be unconstitutional.
8 In addition, the inoiqence of liability to former miners may be·
skewed artificially by the regulation imposing liability upon the company which last employed the claimant without regard to previous
employment with other companies. 20 CFR § 725.311 (197j) . Thevalidity oJ t.bitl reg_ulat\m i:.e_mams. tQ be. cQlls,i.dered, See ante, at

~to..

'

'

:

8

N MINING CO.

The constitutionality of the retr
ctive liability in
~
question here ultimately turns on the
histicated ques~
tions of economic fact suggested above, n this casex•a- e--- - - - ,
J
cided on the Government's motion for summary judgment,
,
/
the Operators have failed to make 1,factual showings
~
that support their sweeping assertions of irrationality. Although I find these assertions strongly suggestive that Congress has acted irrationally in pursuing a
legitimate end, I am not satisfied that they are suffi. nt-in the absence of appropriate factual support-to override the presumption of constitutionality. Accordingly, I agree that the Government was entitled to
summary judgment on this record,
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring.
Appellants in No. 74-1316, the Operators, challenge as
unconstitutional the retroactive obligations imposed on
them by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq.
(Act). The Court rejects their contention in Part IV
of its opinion. I concur in the judgment as to Part IV,
and concur in other portions of the opinion not inconsistent with the views herein expressed.

I
Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was not recognized in the
United States until the 1950's, and there was no federal

74---1302 & 74---1316-CONCUR
2

USERY v. TURNER ELKHORN MINING CO.

legislation providing benefits to its victims until the
enactment of this statute in 1969. In Title IV of the
Act, Congress significantly redefined the respective rights
and obligations of miners and their employers in regard
to this disease by establishing a benefits scheme to compensate victims of pneumoconiosis.1 Under Title IV
miners who filed claims before July 1, 1973, are to collect
benefits from the Federal Government, §§ 411-414, 30
U. S. C. §§ 921- 924. 2 Miners filing cl~ims after June 30,
1973, are to collect benefits until 1981, see ante, at 21- 22,
n. 24, from their individual employers. § 415, 421-431,
30 U.S. C. §§ 925, 931-941. 8 Under the statute, the class
of claimants to which individual employers are liable includes both (i) miners employed at the time of or after
enactment and (ii) miners no longer employed in the
industry at the time of enactment ("former miners") .
The unprecedented feature of the Act is that miners
may be eligible to receive benefits from a particular coalmining concern even if the miner was no longer employed in the industry at the time of ·enactment. The
Department of Labor already has made initial determinations of liability against one of the Operators and
1 Title II of the Act pre.5cribes the maintenance of less hazardous
mine conditions in the future. § 201 et seq., 30 U. S. C. § 841 et
seq.
2
As does the Court, I simplify by not distinguishing between
claims by employees and claims by their survivors. See ante, at 10
n. 13.
8
Claims filed between July 1, 1973, and December 31, 1973, were
to be paid by the Federal Government until December 31, 1973, after
which they became the responsibility of individual mining concerns.
§ 415, 30 U. S. C. § 925. Liability on the part of individual mining
concerns arises only if the claimant docs not have recourse to an applicable state workmen's compensation program approved by the
Secreta.ry of Labor, §§ 421-422, 30 U. S. C. §§ 931-932, but no such
state programs have been approved. See ante, at 4---5,
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m favor of claimants whose employment terminated
decades ago.4

II
The Operators do not challenge their liability to miners
employed at the time of or aft.er enactment, a liability
which accords with familiar principles of workmen's
compensation. 5 They contend, howeyer, that a statutory liability to former miners has been imposed in violation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against arbitrary, irrational, or discriminatory legislation, see, e. g.,
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S . .78, 81 (1971), as there
is no rational justification for imposing liability to
former miners upon individual mine owners.,
The Court recognizes that its evaluation of the raFavorable initial determinations have been made for claimants
who left mine work in 1923, 1927, 1931, 1932, 1937, 1943, 1946,
and 1948. Brief for Operators, 30 n. 1. The,,e determinations
rebut the Government's s~ggestion that in combination the initial
period of federal liability and the statute of limitations specified in
§ 422 (f) ( 1), 30 U. S. C. § 932 (f) ( 1), will prevent employer liability to miners who left the industry before passnge of the Act.
See ante, at 11-12, n. 14.
.'i Congress apparently recognized that the employers burdened
by retroactive liability were not blameworthy. Senator Ja.vits, who
played a significant role in the deYelopment of individual-employer
liability, see Brief for Opera.tors, at 34, thought that the "blame"
for past neglect must be shared by "aU of us," including "the industry, the medical profes8ion, and the Government-particularly
the Public Health Service." House Comm. on Education and Labor,
Legislative History /Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 338
(Comm. Print 1970) (floor remarks) .
The retroactive nature of the liability makes deterrence an insufficient justification. In their prospective application, it is rational for Title IV and other workmen's compensation schemes to
disadvantage competitively employers who take less effective precautions to protect their employees. But only prospective liability
creates an incentive for occupational safety measures.
4
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tionality of the employers' challenged liability must take
into account the retroactive nature of the liability: ·
"The retrospective aspects of legislation, as well
as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due
process, and the justifications for the latter may not
suffice for the former. Thus, in this case the justifica.tion for the retrospective imposition of liability
must take into account the possibilities that the
Operators may not have knO\vn of the danger of
their employees' contracting pneumoconiosis, and
that even if they did know of the danger their conduct may have been taken in reliance upon the
current state of the law . . . ." Ante, at 12-13.
The Court then acknowledges that the Act would not be
justified "on any theory of deterrence . . . or blameworthiness." Id., at 13. It nonetheless sustains the
provision for retroactive liability, reasoning as follows:
"We find ... that the imposition of liability for
the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified
as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from
the fruits of their labor-the operators and the coal
consumers." Id., at 13- 14.

.

.

I,

~-

"We are unwilling to assess the wisdom of Congress'
chosen scheme by examining the degree to which the
'cost-savings' enjoyed by operators in the pre-enactment period produced 'excess' profits, or the degree
to which the retrospective liability imposed on the
early operators can now be passed on to the consumer. It is enough to say that the Act approa.ches
the problem of cost-spreading rationally ...." / d.,
at 14-15.
In my view whether the retroactive liability is consti-

.,
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tutional is a considerably closer question than the Court's
treatment suggests. The rationality of retrospective liability as a cost-spreading device is highly questionable .
If coal mining concerns actually enjoyed "excess"
profits in the pre-enactment period by virtue of their
nonliability for pneumoconiosis, and if such profits could
be quantified in some discernible way, Congress ration- \
ally could impose retrospective liability for the benefit
of the miners concerned. But, in this context, the term
"excess profits" must mean profits over and above
those that Operators would have made in yea.rs and
decades past if they had set aside from current operations funds sufficient to provide compensation, although under no obligation to do so. It is unlikely
that such profits existed. The coal industry is highly
competitive and prices normally are determined by market forces. One therefore "·ould expect that, had a
compensation increment been added to operating costs,
the Operators over the long term simply would have
passed most of it on to consumers, thereby leaving
their profitability relatively unaffected. In short, the
talk of "excess profits" in any realistic sense is wholly
speculative.
Nor can I accept without serious question the Court's
view that the costs now imposed by the Act may be
passed on to consumers. Firms burdened with retroactive payments must meet that expense from current
production and current sales in a market where prices
must be competitive with the prices of firms not so
burdened. One ordinarily would expect that if burdened
firms are to meet both competitive prices and their retroactive obligations, their profits necessarily will be less
than those of their competitors. Thus, the burdened
firms in all likelihood will have to bear the costs of the
retroactive liability rather than passing those costs on
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to consumers. And they must bear such costs quite
without regard to whether "-excess profits" may have
been made in some earlier years. 6
In some industries conditions might be such that the \
cost of retroactively imposed benefits could be spread
to consumers. It seems most unlikely, however, that
the coal industry is such an industry. A notable fact
about coal mining is that the industry curr-ently employs
only about 150,000 persons, whereas in 1939 it employed
nearly 450,000. Brief for Operators 24. The reduced
scale of employment in the coal industry, combined with
the liability to former miners and their survivors, means
that retroactive obligations almost certainly will be disproportionate to the scale of current operations. 1 Moreover, it is unlikely that liability to former miners will be
distributed randomly across the industry, as it is dictated
by historical patterns that may be wholly unrelated to the
present contours of the industry. Two examples are illustrative: (i) Some coal-mining concerns have been in
the mining business for decades, while some competitors
have commenced operation more recently. The exposure
of the former group to cla.ims of employees long separated
from active employment is likely to be significantly
greater than that of their competitors. (ii) Some comIt is, of course, impossible to spread the cost to "coal consumers"
who "profited from the fruits of [former employees'] labor." Ante,
at 14. A coal mining concern cannot retroactively increase its prices
to the former customers who benefitted from the pre-1969 labors
of former miners. The only consumers, therefore, who could bear
these burdens are those who purch_ase coal currently. But in a
free market such customers cannot be expected to pay a reparation
add-on for coal produced by disadvantaged coal companies when the
same product is readily obtainable from others at a lower price.
7
Indeed, the number of former miners and survivors whom an
individual employer is obliged to compensate could be larger than
the employer's present workforce.
6

.
'•

•. .
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panies engaged in coal mining in years past on a much
larger scale and with many more employees than currently. This is not an unusual situation in a "depleting
asset" industry, where smaller companies often lack the
resources with which to continue the acquisition ·and development of new properties. Stronger competitors, on
the other hand, may have operated on a constant or an
increasingly large scale. 8 In each case the competitively
disadvantaged companies may be unable to spread a
substantial portion of their costs to consumers. In view
of these considerations it is unrealistic to think that the
Act will spread costs to "the operators and the coal consumers," ante, at 14, and thus I question the Court's
conclusion that the Act is rational in imposing retroactive liability.

III
Despite the foregoing, I must concur in the judgment
on the record before us. Congress had broad discretion
in formulating a statute to deal with the serious problem
of pneumoconiosis affecting former miners. E. g., Richardson, supra; cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U. S. 483 (1955). Nor does the Constitution require
that legisla.tion on economic matters be compatible with
sound economics or even with normal fairness. As a result, economic and remedial social enactments ca.rry a
strong presumption of constitutionality, e. g., United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 148
(1938), and the Operators had the heavy burden of
showing the Act to be unconstitutional.
8
In addition, the incidence of liability to former miners may be
skewed artificially by the regulation imposing liability upon the company which last employed the claimant without regard to previous
rmployment with other companies. 20 CFR § 725.311 (1976), The
validity of this regulation remains to be considered. See a~te, at
9-10.
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The constitutionality of the retrospective liability in
question here ultimately turns on the sophisticated questions of economic fact suggested above, and these facts
are likely to vary widely among the Operators.9 In this
case, however, decided on the Government's inotion for
summary judgment, the Operators have failed to make
any factual showings that support their sweeping assertions of irrationality. Although I find these assertions
strongly suggestive that Congress has acted irrationally
in pursuing a legitimate end, I am not satisfied that they
are sufficient- in the absence of appropriate factual support-to override the presumption of constitutionality.
Accordingly, I agree that the Government was entitled
.to summary judgment on this record.

9
I would not foreclose the possibility that a particular coal mining
concern, in a proper case, may be able to show that the impact of
the Act on its operations is irrational. Cf. ante, at 22.
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[July 1, 1976]
MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring.
Appellants in No. 74-1316, the Operators, challenge as
unconstitutional the retroactive obligations imposed on
them by the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, 83 Stat. 792, as amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150, 30 U. S. C. § 901 et seq,
(Act). The Court rejects their contention in Part IV
of its opinion. I concur in the judgment as to Part IV,
and concur in other portions of the opinion not inconsis~
ent with the views herein expressed.

I
Coal miner's pneumoconiosis was not recognized in the
United States until the 1950's, and there was no federal

.'

\
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legislation providing benefits to its victims until the
enactment of this statute in 1969. In Title IV of th~
Act, Congress significantly redefined the respective rights
and obligations of miners and their employers in regard
to this disease by establishing a benefits scheme to compensate victims of pneumoconiosis. 1 Under Title IV
miners who filed claims before July 1, 1973, are to collect
\ benefits from the Federal Government, §§ 411-414, 30
U. S. C. §§ 921-924. 2 Miner~ filing claims after June 30,
1973, are to collect benefits until 1981, see ante, at 21-22,
h. 24, from their individual employers. § 415, 421-43.1,,
30 U. S. C. §§ 925, 931-941. 3 Under the statute, the class
6f claimants to which individual employers are liable in- _.
eludes both (i) miners employed at the time of or after .
enactment and (ii) miners no longer employed in the
industry at the time of enactment ("former miners"). .,,
The unprecedented feature of the Act is that miners
inay be eligible to receive benefits from a particular coal~
mining concern even if the miner was no longer em-ployed in the industry at the time of enactment. The
Department of Labor already has made initial deter-,
minations of liability against one of the Operators and

''·

Title II of the Act prescribes the µiaintenance of less hazardou~ t
mine conditions jn the future. § 201 et seq., ·30 u'. S. C. § 841 et
seq.
'
.· ·
··i, ,
·,
2 As does the Court, l simplify by not distinguishing between
1
claims by employees and clahils by their ~urvivor~. See ante, at 10
n! 13.
. . .-,)
. .
.
.
,
8 Clahns filed b~tween' July 1, 197:3,'and'December 31, 1973, were .
to be paid by the Federal Government until December 31, 1973, after ·
w~ich they became the , responsibility of individual mining concerns.. .
§ 415, 30 U. S. C. § 925. Liability on the part of individual mining .
concerns arises only if the. claimant does not have recourse to an ap .. ,
pfJcable state workmen's compen~_ation program approved by the· l
Secretary of Labor, §§ ~ 1-422, 3~. UclS.
§t9_3~- 9~2,...P,Ut no such
stitte pr-ograms··have been approved. See ante, at 4-5. ·
1

7
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in favor of claimants whose employment terminated
decades ago.4

II
The Operators do not challenge their liability to miners
employed at the time of or after enactment, a liability
which accords with familiar principles of workmen's
·compensation. 5 They contend, however, that a statutory liability to former miners has been imposed in violation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against arbitrary, irrational, or discriminatory legislation, see, e. g.,
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81 (1971), as there
is no rational justification for imposing liability to
former miners upon individual mine owners.,
The Court recognizes that its evaluation of the ra4 Favorable initial determinations have been made for claimants
who left mine work in 1923, 1927, 1931, 1932, 1937, 1943, 1946,
and 1948. Brief for Operators, 30 n. 1. These determinations
rebut the Government's suggestion that in combination the initial
period of federal liability and ·the statute of limitations specified in
§422 (f)(l), 30 U.S. C. §932 (f)(l), will prevent employer liability to miners who left the industry, before passage of the Act.
See ante, at 11-12, n. 14.
5 Congress apparently recognized that the employers burdened
by retroactive liability were not blameworthy. Senator Javits, who
played a significant role in the developm_ent of individual-employer
liability, see Brief for Operators, at 34, thought that the "blame"
tor past neglect must be shared by "all of us," including "the industry, the medical profession, and the Government-particularly
the Public Health Service." House Comm. on Education and Labor,
Legislative History /Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 338'
(Comm. Print 1070) (floor remarks).
The retroactive nature of the liability makes deterrence an insufficient justification. In their prospective applicatio11, it is rational for Title IV and other workmen's compensation schemes to,
disadvantage competitively employers who take less effective preca.utions to protect their employees. But only prospective liability
'Crea.tes. an incentive for oocupa.tional safety uooasures.

'"

.,,

l l

.,,
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tionality of the employers' challenged liability must take
into account the retroactive nature of the liability :
"The retrospective aspects of legislation, as well
as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due
process, and the justifications for the latter may not
suffice for the former. Thus, in this case the justification for the retrospective imposition of liability
must take into account the possibilities that the
Operators may not have known of the danger of
their employees' contracting pneumoconiosis, and
that even if they did know of the danger their conduct may have been taken in reliance upon the
current state of the law ...." Ante, at 12-13.
The Court then acknowledges that the Act would not be
justified "on any theory of deterrence . . . or blameworthiness." Id., at 13. It nonetheless sustains the
provision for retroactive liability, reasoning as follows :
"We find . . . that the imposition of liability for
the effects of disabilities bred in the past is justified
as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from
the fruits of their labor-the operators and the coal
consumers." Id., at 13-14.
"We are unwilling to assess the wisdom of Congress1
chosen scheme by examining the degree to which the
'cost-savings' enjoyed by operators in the pre-enactment period produced 'excess' profits, or the degree
to which the retrospective liability imposed on the
early operators can now be passed on to the consumer. It is enough to say that the Act approaches
the problem of cost-spreading rationally ... ." Id.,
at 14--15.
In my view whether the retroactive liability is consti-
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tutional is a considerably closer question than the Court's
treatment suggests. The rationality of retrospective liability as a cost-spreading device is highly questionable.
If coal mining concerns actually enjoyed "excess"
profits in the pre-enactment period by virtue of their
nonliability for pneumoconiosis, and if such profits could
be quantified in some discernible way, Congress rationally could impose retrospective liability for the benefit
of the miners concerned. But, in tpis context, the term
"excess profits" must mean profits over and above
those that Operators would have made in years and
decades past if they had set aside from current operations funds sufficient to provide compensation, although under no oblig_ation to do so. It is unlikely
that such profits existed. The coal industry is highly
competitive and prices norma.lly are determined by market forces. One therefore would expect that, had a
compensation increment been added to operating costs,
the Operators over the long term simply would have
passed most of it on to consumers, thereby leaving
their profitability relatively unaffected. In short, the
talk of "excess profits" in any realistic sense is wholly
speculative.
Nor can I accept without serious question the Court's
view that the costs now imposed by the Act may be
passed on to consumers. Firms burdened with retroactive payments must meet that expense from current
production and current sales in a ma.r ket where prices
must be competitive with the prices of firms not so
burdened. One ordinarily would expect that if burdened
firms are to meet both competitive prices and their retroactive obligations, their profits necessarily will be less
than those of their competitors. Thus, the burdened
firms in all likelihood will have to bear the costs of th~
retroactive liability rather than passirig those costs on

...
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to consumers. And they must bear such costs quite
without regard to whether "excess profits" may have
been made in some earlier years. 6
In some industries conditions might be such that the
cost of retroactively imposed benefits could be spread
to <;:onsumers. It seems most unlikely, however, that
the coal industry is such an industry. A notable fact
about coal mining is' that the industry currently employs
only about 150,000 persons, whereas in 1939 it employed
nearly 450,000. Brief for Operators 24. The reduced
scale of employment in the coal industry, combined with
the liability to former miners and their survivors, means
that retroactive obligations almost certainly will be disproportionate to the scale of current operations. 7 Moreover, it is unlikely that liability to former miners will be
distributed randomly across the industry, as it is dictated
by historical patterns that may be wholly unrelated to the
present contours of the industry. Two examples are illustrative: (i) Some coal-mining concerns have been in
the mining business for decades, while some competitors
have commenced operation more recently. The exposure
of the former group to cla.ims of employees long separated
from active employment is likely to be significantly
greater than that of their competitors. (ii) Some com- .

~.'

6 It is, of course, impossible to spread the cost to "coal consumers"
who "profited from the fruits of [former employees'] labor." Ante,
at 14. A coal mining concern cannot retroactively increase its prices.
to the former customers who benefitted from the pre-1969 labors
of former miners. The only consumers, therefore, who could bear
these burdens are those who purchase coal currently. But in a
free market such customers cannot be expected to pay a reparation
add-on for coal produced by disadvantaged coal companies when the
same product is readily obtainable from others at a lower price.
7
Indeed, the number of former miners and survivors whom an
individual employer is obliged to compensate could be larger than
i the e~ployer's present workforce.
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-panies engaged in coal mining in years past on a much
larger scale and with many more employees than currently. This is not an unusual situation in a "depleting
asset" industry, where smaller companies often lack the
resources with which to continue the acquisition and development of new properties. Stronger competitors, on
the other hand, may have operated on a constant or an
increasingly large scale. 8 In each case the competitively
disadvantaged companies may be unable to spread a
substantial portion of their costs to consumers. In view
of these considerations it is unrealistic to think that the
Act will spread costs to "the operators and the coal consumers," ante, at 14, and thus I question the Court's
conclusion that the Act is rational in imposing retroactive liability.

'

.';-,

',•

.,•
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III
Despite the foregoing, I must concur in the judgment
on the record before us. Congress had broad discretion
in formulating a statute to deal with the serious problem
of pneumoconiosis affecting former miners. E. g., Richardson, su:pra; cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U. S. 483 (1955). Nor does the Constitution 'require
that legislation on economic matters be compatible with
sound economics or even with normal fairness. As a result, economic and remedial social enactments ca.r ry a
strong presumption of constitutionality, e. g., United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 148
(l938), and the Operators had the heavy burden of
showing the Act to be unconstitutional.
8

In addition, the incidence of liability to former mi1'ers may be
skewed artificially by the regulation imposing liability upon the company which last employed the claimant without regard to previous
employment with other companies. 20 CFR § 725.311 (1!}76) , The
validity of this regulation remains to be considered. See ante, at
9-10.
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The constitutionality of the retrospective liability in·
question here ultimately turns on the sophisticated questions of economic fact suggested above, and these facts
are likely to vary widely among the Operators.1l In this
pase, however, decided on the Government's motion for
summary judgment, the Operators have failed to make
~ny factual showings that support their sweeping assertions of irrationality. Although I find these assertions
strongly suggestive that Congress has acted irrationally
in pursuing a legitimate end, I am not satisfied that they
ltre sufficient-in the absence of appropriate factual support-to override the presumption of constitutionality.
Accordingly, I agree that the Government was entitled
to summary judgment on this record.

,,

''

9
I would not foreclose the possibility that a particular coal mining;
concern, in a proper case, may be able to show that the impact of
t he Act on its operations is irrational. Cf. ante, at 22.
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